FIFA established a bid evaluation model comprising three components: bid compliance assessment, overall risk assessment and technical evaluation.[1] The “technical evaluation” aspect of this bid evaluation model adopts an objective scoring system to rate and attribute a weight to each of the nine infrastructural and revenue-related criteria set out in clause 3.5 of the Bidding Registration.[1] The methodology and application of this scoring system are specified in the document "Overview of Scoring System for the Technical Evaluation of Bids", which details how infrastructure and revenue-related criteria are scored.[1]

FIFA has established a bid evaluation model comprising three (3) components: a “bid compliance” assessment; an “overall risk assessment” of each bid, which assesses the risks and benefits of, as well as a cost and revenue projection in connection with, each bid; and a “technical evaluation” of each bid, which assesses the quantities and qualities of certain key infrastructural and revenue/cost components of each bid and documents the results in a technical evaluation report by means of a scoring system established by FIFA.[2] Infrastructure comprises six key criteria accounting for 70% of the overall score for the technical evaluation, and commercial consists of three key elements accounting for the remaining 30%.[2] In terms of the threshold to be applied, FIFA shall require a minimum of four (4) existing stadiums as part of a bid; any bid which does not provide at least four (4) existing stadiums will receive a score of less than 2.0 for the criterion of Stadiums.[2]

This paper examines the FIFA World Cup (FWC) human rights governance arrangements, through an analysis of strategic documents, observations of three host cities, and interviews with key actors. Over time, FIFA, in response to changing societal and stakeholder expectations and pressure, has accommodated external pressures by making adjustments, such as embedding human rights into the bidding criteria for its tournaments while maintaining its profit-driven priorities. We conclude that while positive steps have been made, with human rights structures, policies and processes now in place at FIFA, host nation(s) and host cities; issues of implementation remain throughout each level of the FWC institutional field. FIFA’s institutional priorities remain dominated by a business logic, where protecting the organization’s financial and operational stability takes precedence over advancing broader ethical or social agendas. This corporate logic thus inhibits new logics from other levels of the FWC organizational hierarchy, such as host cities or FIFA’s own human rights team, to be accommodated and integrated into its culture.

The 2026 FIFA World Cup bid evaluation report provides an introduction and overview of the bidding process and then details the individual evaluations of the bids from Morocco and United 2026, assessing compliance, technical requirements, risks, and other factors.[5] It includes annexes with additional details on the evaluations, including ratings of stadiums, infrastructure, and commercial aspects as part of FIFA’s scoring system.[5] The report shows Morocco’s bid was deemed high risk and the United joint bid was rated as low risk to FIFA, reflecting how the evaluation framework treated different infrastructural and commercial profiles.[2][5]

Under the Bidding Regulations, FIFA established a bid evaluation model comprising three components: bid compliance assessment; overall risk assessment; technical evaluation. The “technical evaluation” aspect of this bid evaluation model adopts an objective scoring system to rate and attribute a weighting to each of the nine infrastructural and revenue-related criteria set out in clause 3.5 of the Bidding Registration, which is appended to the Bidding Regulations. The methodology and application of this scoring system are specified in the Overview of the Scoring System for the Technical Evaluation of Bids.

The revamped bidding process to select the hosts of the FIFA World Cup involved changes at four levels. First, a transparent evaluation process, with bid books, hosting requirements, bid evaluation reports and scores made public. Second, an independent evaluation process with a bid evaluation task force responsible for analysing the bids by delivering a bid evaluation report comprising the compliance, the risk (including adverse human rights impacts in connection with hosting the competition) and the technical assessment (involving infrastructure and commercial aspects), and an independent audit company acting as observer.[5] Despite these important regulatory changes which have already influenced the bidding process for the designation of the FIFA 2023 Women’s World Cup and 2026 World Cup, more efforts could be made by considering integrity aspects – especially in relation to transparency – in the evaluation of hosting capacity and legacy outcomes.[5]

The potential for corruption begins with the host country selection process. Members of the head organizational committee (e.g. FIFA’s executive committee) act as principals for the interests of the committee and FIFA at large; however, in addition to the motivation to do what is in the interest of the organization, they also have the motivation to act in self-interest. Thus, if a local organizing committee or other entity offers a bribe on behalf of a given country, a principal-agent problem arises in which a member’s interests no longer align with those of the organization. In the processes required to host a sports mega-event, corruption has been prevalent on numerous occasions, leading to unnecessary costs becoming embedded in the bidding, construction, and organization of these events.

For the 2026 bidding cycle, each bid book was first evaluated by the 2026 Bid Evaluation Task Force, who then submitted an evaluation report to the FIFA Council.[3] In the report, the task force evaluated each bid’s infrastructure and commercial potential using a one to five scoring system; these infrastructure and commercial components are the two main categories involved, and are weighted differently (infrastructure: 70%, commercial: 30%).[3] Examples include stadiums, which were worth 35% of the overall score, and predicted organising costs, which were worth 10%; stadiums had to achieve at least a score of two out of five.[3]

The research in relation to failing bids is still limited. There is thus a gap in previous research about the international sports federations’ (ISFs) governance failure in relation to the bid process and the reasons why some nations and cities choose not to comply with the institutional frameworks and requirements of the ISFs. Research on unsuccessful bids remains limited, revealing a gap in the literature concerning ISFs’ governance failures and the reasons why certain nations and cities opt not to conform to ISFs’ institutional frameworks and stipulations. This paper has examined the reasons behind the withdrawal of Oslo and Stockholm—both located in countries that rank highly on various democracy indices—from their applications to host the 2022 Winter Olympics.

"The evaluation of all bids received is conducted by an independent bid evaluation task force, supported by the FIFA General Secretariat."[7] This chapter on the FIFA World Cup bidding process explains that the task force assesses bids based on predefined criteria and that the reformed post-2015 procedures were designed to enhance transparency and objectivity, including for the 2026 cycle.[7] It outlines how technical, commercial and risk-related dimensions are systematically incorporated into the evaluation framework.[7]

There is not any single framework or definite model that exists for policy makers, organizers and governing bodies underpinning the assessment procedure for human rights or due diligence of whole organizing mega events as unifying features. Similarly, the source analyzes the absence of systems throughout the bidding process and focuses on identifying approaches that could potentially improve the situation. To ensure compliance with these principles, FIFA and the IOC can incorporate human rights standards into their bidding processes for mega-sport events. The two international institutions can demand that a country willing to host a mega-sport event achieve some level of human rights standards and provide information on what it has done to meet such standards.

The economic impacts of hosting a mega sporting event (MSE) like the Olympics or FIFA World Cup have fittingly received the highest amount of quantitative research determining how these events affect host cities and countries. By compiling a variety of data, case studies, and anecdotes, it becomes apparent that the sheer scale of mega sporting events and their governing procedures means that the average host city cannot economically, socially, or sustainably host a one-time event like the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup. Overall, very few cities can successfully plan for the multi-faceted nature of hosting such a large sporting event, and even fewer are set up in positions that can leverage this planning to effectively realize positive economic impacts in the long-run.

In the bid evaluation report, Morocco's bid was deemed high risk and the United joint bid was rated as low risk to FIFA.[2] The reformed bidding process for 2026 focused on technical requirements, stadium and infrastructure requirements, sustainable event management, human rights and environmental protection, as well as governmental support, organisational models, and legacy funds.[2] The process introduced updated assessment mechanisms and minimum technical specifications that bidders had to meet by 16 March 2018.[2]

Under the Bidding Regulations, FIFA established a bid evaluation model comprising three components: bid compliance assessment, overall risk assessment, technical evaluation. The “technical evaluation” aspect of this bid evaluation model adopts an objective scoring system to rate and attribute a weighting to each of the nine infrastructural and revenue-related criteria set out in clause 3.5 of the Bidding Registration. The methodology and application of this scoring system are specified in the Overview of the Scoring System for the Technical Evaluation of Bids.

Therefore, to rid itself of increasing allegations of corruption and disregard for human rights in its bidding processes ahead of the 2018 Russia and 2022 Qatar World Cup, FIFA launched several human rights reforms and policies, starting with the adoption of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and setting up an Independent Human Rights Advisory Board in 2016 to guide the implementation of its human rights obligations.[6] This paper adopted a qualitative research method and a case study design to assess Atlanta’s level of compliance with FIFA’s human rights bidding requirements as it prepares to host the 2026 men’s FIFA World Cup.[6] The focus is on local compliance with human rights bidding criteria rather than structural commercial or infrastructural advantages in the bid evaluation framework.[6]

In the past, the bidding model for events such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games has favoured the organisers and placed bidding cities at a disadvantage. In the Olympic bidding process, for example, the IOC has traditionally defined the ideal host as the city offering the best sporting venues and accompanying infrastructure. As all candidate cities’ objective is to secure the games, they are tempted to ‘overbid’ by promising the best, state-of-the-art stadiums and extensive supporting infrastructure. In recent years, the bidding process for mega-events has been amended, with both the IOC and FIFA awarding hosting rights to two cities or nations simultaneously and taking into account a broader range of success criteria.

FIFA Media announced that the 2026 FIFA World Cup bid evaluation report had been published and that the bids were submitted to the FIFA Council.[9] The communication confirms the existence of a formal evaluation document covering the technical, infrastructural and commercial aspects of the competing bids prior to the Council and Congress decisions.[9]

Certainty in hosting the tournament was achieved by using existing infrastructure. The United Bid included candidate host cities with all the pre-existing necessary infrastructure – notably each candidate city featured stadia with capacities of 68,000 or greater – thus avoiding need for new constructions (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018: 21). With more than 125 FIFA compatible stadia in existence across the three nations, the bid guaranteed FIFA timely delivery of all venues and facilities and avoided any of the human rights issues that have plagued stadium and infrastructure construction. FIFA internal assessments subsequently marked the United Bid as the lowest risk of the two bids in all categories except political support. The technical reports also scored the United Bid far higher than Morocco (United Bid scored 4 out of 5, Morocco 2.7), echoing the superiority and certainty offered by the United Bid in FIFA’s official evaluation report.

This chapter presents an overview of mega-events trends and impacts in BRICS countries, drawing from a review of published literature and research reports. There is an increasing trend of declining bids for, and contestations against, hosting mega-sporting events in global North (western) cities, and bidding for mega-events is shifting towards BRICS and other emerging economies. Given the negative socio-economic repercussions of mega-sporting events, it is necessary for future host nations, especially BRICS, to consider the sustainability challenges before committing to the bidding process.

The FIFA World Cup 2026 Human Rights Framework describes how host city committees must develop tailored human rights action plans connected to the hosting and staging of the tournament.[6] It emphasises responsible procurement, infrastructure projects that respect human rights and the environment, and grievance mechanisms for tournament-related impacts, indicating that governance for 2026 extends beyond purely commercial and technical criteria to social and rights-based considerations.[6]

This report examines the human rights themes in FIFA's bid criteria, takes a closer look at each city's plan, and collects highlights from the plans for hosting the tournament. It analyses how human rights guarantees, labour protections and anti-discrimination commitments were incorporated into the 2026 bid framework and evaluated by FIFA. The focus is on the human rights dimension of the bid process rather than on whether the technical and commercial evaluation structure systematically favoured bids with existing infrastructure or commercial advantages.

Overall, bidding processes should: (1) be written; (2) not be subject to easy alteration; (3) account for regional balance; (4) be accompanied by clear, public criteria; and (5) include transparent, independent oversight. International federations should ensure that bid evaluation processes do not simply reward existing infrastructure and financial capacity, but also take into account human rights, sustainability and legacy considerations. If bidding processes focus too narrowly on commercial and infrastructural advantages, they risk excluding potential hosts that might deliver stronger social outcomes or rights protections.

The evaluation report for the FIFA World Cup 2030 explains that the assessment "focuses on the defined priority areas of the event vision and key metrics, infrastructure, services, commercial aspects, and sustainability and human rights."[8] While referring to 2030, it shows continuity in FIFA’s bid evaluation approach that heavily weighs existing infrastructure and commercial potential as central pillars of bid assessment.[8]

The dissertation consists of two distinct qualitative case studies focusing on the bid and planning phases of the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Specifically, it examines how human rights strategies were developed and implemented in the context of the 2026 bidding framework and early planning. While it provides detailed analysis of governance, stakeholder engagement and rights-based criteria in the 2026 bid process, it does not primarily address whether FIFA’s technical and commercial evaluation model structurally advantaged bids with inherited infrastructural or commercial capacities.

This paper proposes a novel governance innovation for the FIFA World Cup 2026 entitled the Global Football Prestige and Motivation Framework, aimed at enhancing transparency, accountability and stakeholder motivation in the organisation of the tournament.[7] While the article engages with FIFA governance reforms and the 2026 World Cup, its primary focus is on proposing a new governance model and incentive structure rather than empirically investigating whether the existing 2026 bid evaluation framework systematically favoured bids with inherited commercial and infrastructural advantages.[7]

Discussion of earlier World Cup bid evaluation reports notes that across 17 risk categories, England and Spain/Portugal had the most low-risk gradings, while Russia’s bid had more medium risk assessments.[4] The report praised England’s transport, IT infrastructure and technology, event safety, marketing, media and communication, and criticised Russia’s transport and technology infrastructure, highlighting how inherited infrastructural conditions were central to FIFA’s risk assessment.[4]

One of the greatest accountability gaps in international sports governance is the absence of independent oversight mechanisms to monitor human rights compliance in the context of major sporting events. Despite referencing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in their policies, FIFA and the IOC have not developed robust enforcement frameworks to ensure compliance. The failure to align sponsorship criteria and bidding processes with human rights considerations further illustrates the lack of real commitment to ethical governance by both FIFA and the IOC.

Recent academic work on mega-event governance and bidding has tended to focus on corruption in host selection, economic (cost–benefit) outcomes for host cities and nations, human rights risks, and political contestation around bids, rather than the detailed design of specific bid evaluation frameworks. There is limited published scholarship that systematically analyses FIFA’s 2026 World Cup bid evaluation framework with respect to whether its scoring criteria structurally favour bids from countries with inherited commercial advantages (such as large media markets, existing football infrastructure, and established sponsorship ecosystems). Most discussions of the 2026 process in academic and policy literature treat FIFA’s reforms (e.g. expanded technical evaluations and human rights criteria) at a general level without interrogating their distributive effects between different categories of bidders.