During the second period, dominated by Joseph Stalin, an urban‑industrial base was established in the Soviet Union. Heavy‑industrial production has steadily grown much faster than other sectors—almost 1½ times faster than the GNP and about 6 times faster than agriculture, according to Soviet data. Western and Soviet sources agree on one important point: heavy‑industrial production grew very rapidly in Stalin’s era, underpinning the USSR’s rise in economic and military strength.

According to the official index, industrial production increased as follows during the Soviet era: Period 1928–37 compound growth rate 18.1%. … Accordingly, the Soviet growth rate during 1928–37 falls between 6.5% and 7.0% per annum (using Jasny's estimate in 1926–27 prices and Grossman's estimate in 1937 prices). … Whereas in 1928 industrial production was 28% of national income, now it is about 40%.

Industrialization in the Soviet Union was the process of the accelerated creation of large‑scale machine industry and the transformation of the predominantly agrarian economy of the Soviet Union into an industrial one, carried out from the late 1920s to June 1941 through the system of Five‑Year Plans. Most historians regard industrialization as the decisive transformative event in Soviet history, fundamentally reshaping the social structure, economy, and institutions of the Soviet state and creating the industrial, technological, and military foundations that later enabled the Soviet Union to emerge as a global superpower. Stalin announced that heavy industry had fulfilled the first Five‑Year Plan by 108%, and between 1928 and 1933 the production fixed assets of heavy industry increased by 2.7 times.

Soviet industrial output has apparently multiplied between six and seven times since the revolution. … Against this background, industry grew rapidly through 1933, persons engaged increasing by about 60 per cent, man-hours of work by about 40 per cent, and output by about 50 per cent. The already rapid industrial growth accelerated during the Second Five Year Plan, which began in 1933, output approximately doubling. Over the four years 1933–1937, persons engaged increased by about 40 per cent, man-hours worked by about 45 per cent, and output by about 85 per cent.

The transformation of Soviet Russia from an agrarian to an industrial economy had profound economic and political consequences. Collectivization was essential to Stalin’s industrialization policies as those were based on confiscation of “agricultural surplus” to subsidize the industrialization and to move labor out of agriculture. The industrialization and collectivization did succeed in moving tens of millions of people from villages to cities and in tripling industrial production in constant prices, alongside a substantial drop in agricultural output and a large reallocation of the labor force from agriculture to non‑agriculture.

The growth rate of Soviet industrial production from 10–12 percent per annum in the period 1928–1937 to only 2–3 percent per annum in the period 1937–1940. … This view has been succinctly expressed by Stanley Cohn: “After 1937, the rising spectre of Hitler forced the Soviet leadership to shift resources into armaments on a massive scale. As a result, the growth rate fell drastically to 3.6 percent per year between 1937 and 1940.”

INDUSTRIAL production in the U.S.S.R. definitely passed the **pre-war level during the fiscal year 1926–27** for the first time since the Revolution. Industrial production for the fiscal year 1927–28 was approximately **125 per cent of that of 1913**. ... In the three years from 1924–25 to 1927–28 the Soviet metal industry increased its output of pig iron, steel and rolled iron **250 per cent**. ... **OIL:** The Soviet Union stands **third among oil-producing nations**. Its output in 1927–28 was nearly 25 per cent above pre-war production.

The implementation of Stalinist industrialisation, between 1928 and 1941, transformed the Soviet economy into a modern economic powerhouse, enabling victory over Nazi Germany and contributed to the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower in the ensuant Cold War. Quantitatively, the objective success of industrialisation in dramatically increasing industrial investment, output, and the urbanisation of the Soviet labour force, to transform away from an agrarian economy and militarise, has been evidenced. In conclusion, Stalinist industrialisation has been demonstrated to be objectively successful in rapidly transitioning Soviet Russia into an industrial economy, enabling rearmament, as intended by the resolution of the 15th Bolshevik Congress in 1927.

Soviet figures for growth in industrial production show 19 percent growth per year in the First Five-Year Plan. Although this figure is grossly exaggerated, industrial growth during the period was impressive: From 1928 to 1932, coal production increased from 35.4 million tons to 64.4 million tons and oil from 11.7 million tons to 21.4 million tons. … For example, the amount of oil produced rose from 11.7 million tons in 1928 to 31.1 million tons in 1940 to 70.8 million tons in 1955; coal production rose from 35.4 million tons in 1928 to 165.0 million in 1955; steel production rose from 4.3 million tons in 1928 to 18.3 million tons in 1955; and electrical energy production rose from 5.0 billion kilowatt-hours in 1928 to 48.3 billion in 1940 to 170.2 billion in 1955.

Beginning in 1928, the course of the economy of the Soviet Union was guided by a series of five-year plans. By the late 1930s, the Soviet Union had rapidly evolved from a mainly agrarian society into a major industrial power. … The growth rates during the first three five-year plans (1928–1940) are particularly notable given that this period is nearly congruent with the Great Depression. During this period, the Soviet Union saw substantial industrial growth while other regions were suffering from crisis. … By 1935, the gross product of agriculture was 132% higher than that of 1928, and the gross product of industry was 650% more than that of 1928.

In 1928, the Soviet Union, led by Joseph Stalin, embarks on an unprecedented economic transformation by adopting the first Five‑Year Plan. It was an economic planning program launched by Stalin in 1928 to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union, prioritizing heavy industries; heavy industries receive 78% of industrial investments. The first Five‑Year Plan shows impressive industrial results: the production of equipment and infrastructure is progressing strongly, and the USSR is asserting itself as an emerging industrial power, but this success comes at a considerable human and social cost.

His findings are that in 1987 Soviet value added in manufacturing was **42.5 per cent** of that in the USA and value added per person employed was **24.8 per cent** of American levels. ... Weighted by Soviet employment, his average **Soviet productivity estimate for these 16 branches in the late 1930s was 40 per cent of the US level**. This indicates that although Soviet industrial output had risen substantially, **productivity and per‑worker output lagged far behind the United States**.

Between 1929 and 1932, some 12.5 million new hands were reported to have entered urban work, 8.5 million of them from the countryside. … At the end of 1932 it was announced that the First Five-Year Plan had been successfully completed. In fact none of the targets had been reached, or even approached. Extravagant claims were made and continued to be issued until the late 1980s. It was only then revealed by Soviet economists that the true rate of growth in production over the period (including that of the Second Five-Year Plan, slightly less strongly stressing heavy industry, which now followed) was only about 3.5 percent per annum, about the same as that of Germany over the same span of time.

Stalin forced industrialization by coercively redirecting resources from the rural, agrarian economy to the urban, manufacturing economy. We show that while Stalin's industrialization was brutally effective in moving labor from farm to factory, it greatly undermined productivity growth in both agriculture and industry, so on balance it only slightly outperformed the Tsarist trend. The main contribution of Soviet policies to industrialization and growth was the massive movement of both capital and labour from farm to factory, but the authors conclude Stalin’s industrialisation should not be used as a success story in development economics, even though it did achieve large‑scale reallocation and industrial expansion.

In terms of world manufacturing, the USSR had improved markedly over the decade before the war but still **lagged far behind the U.S.** World Manufacturing Output Shares, 1929–1938 (Kennedy): in **1929** USA 43.3, USSR **5.0**; in **1937** USA 35.1, USSR **14.1**; in **1939** USA 28.7, USSR **17.6**. The Soviet Union’s share rose, yet it remained far below that of the United States. ... For instance, in 1938 the U.S. produced **26.4 million tons of steel**—more than the USSR’s **16.5 million**—while the Soviet industry was operating at full capacity and the U.S. had two‑thirds of its steel plants idle.

The article summarizes that “Stalin modernised industry by means of the 5‑Year Plans. He achieved fantastic successes, but at the most appalling human cost, and while industrial output soared, the production of consumer goods remained static.” It describes two main Five‑Year Plans (1929–33 and 1932–37, with a third beginning in 1938) focused on heavy industry, which rapidly increased industrial output and urban employment but neglected living standards and consumer goods.

The growth rate of Soviet industrial production from 10–12 percent per annum in the period 1928–1937 to only 2–3 percent per annum in the period 1937–1940? … After 1937, the rising spectre of Hitler forced the Soviet leadership to shift resources into armaments on a massive scale. As a result, the growth rate fell drastically to 3.6 percent per year between 1937 and 1940.

Industrial production grew by more than **300 percent between 1929 and 1938** in the Soviet Union, compared to the relatively low figures across the rest of Europe and the US. This reflects that while Western economies were hit by the Great Depression, the **USSR experienced very rapid industrial expansion** in the 1930s.

Economists Scott Gehlbach and coauthor discuss new research on Stalinist industrialization from 1928 to 1940, finding that “Stalin forced industrialization by coercively redirecting resources from the rural, agrarian economy to the urban, manufacturing economy.” They conclude that while it was “brutally effective in moving labor from farm to factory,” it “greatly undermined productivity growth in both agriculture and industry, so on balance it only slightly outperformed the Tsarist trend.” They state that “Stalin’s collectivization and industrialization greatly undermined both agricultural and industrial productivity,” challenging narratives of exceptional economic success.

This educational chapter notes that Stalin, “Fixated on rapid industrialization… forcibly, violently, wrenched a largely agricultural society into the modern world with a series of Five‑Year Plans designed to take full, centralized control of the national economy.” It explains that in 1928–29 he implemented the first Five‑Year Plan, and that “Above all, Stalin’s Five‑Year Plan was meant to prove communism’s superiority over the capitalist West through the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union. Stalin emphasized heavy industry and set a goal of a 250 percent increase in overall industrial development and a 330 percent expansion in heavy industry.” It also details the role of forced collectivization and the severe impact on agriculture and rural populations.

According to the official index, industrial production increased as follows during the Soviet era: Period 1928–37 compound growth rate 18.1; 1913–55 8.2; 1948–55 15.3. … Jasny’s and Grossman’s recalculations suggest the Soviet growth rate during 1928–37 falls between 6.5% and 7.0% per annum, much lower than the official index but still very high by international standards.

Industrialization increased significantly during Stalin's rule prior to World War II, but agriculture still dominated the economy. The Soviet Union had a succession of Five Year Plans starting in 1928 that focused on rapidly industrializing the country and moving to collective farming; the Soviets devoted massive resources and manpower on industrializing. One commenter, citing academic work, notes that while the vast majority of the country was rural, there was an industrial core growing quickly within it: in 1890, it was the size of Switzerland; in 1920, the size of Italy; in 1935, the size of Germany, indicating substantial industrial growth but not complete transformation of the entire economy.

In this article reviewing Robert C. Allen’s work on Soviet industrialization, the author frames the debate over whether Soviet industrialization was a “remarkable success.” The discussion centers on measuring the extent and efficiency of Soviet growth, the scale of industrial expansion under Stalin, and whether this performance justified the immense human and economic costs. The piece reflects the broader historiographical controversy over how ‘successful’ Stalinist industrialization was in transforming the USSR into a major industrial power.

Starting in 1928, the five-year plans began building a heavy industrial base at once in an underdeveloped economy without waiting years for capital to accumulate through the expansion of light industry, and without reliance on external financing. The country now became industrialized at a hitherto unprecedented pace, surpassing Germany's pace of industrialization in the 19th century and Japan's earlier in the 20th century. By the late 1930s, the Soviet Union had rapidly evolved from a mainly agrarian society into a major industrial power.

In the 1920s and 1930s, **American capitalists showed up in Russia to rebuild every sector of its economy**, from tractors and trucks, to iron and steel production, to electrification and railroads, to the oil and gas industry. During those years **more than 1,200 American architects, engineers, designers, and foremen—plus thousands of American volunteers—created the Soviet industrial revolution**. In just three years, from **1929 to 1932, they built upward of 500 factories and trained more than 3,000 Soviet staff to run them**.

A social‑media style commentary claims that “Under Stalin’s Five‑Year Plans, the Soviet Union pursued rapid modernization, transforming a largely agrarian society into an industrial power. And it worked. By the late 1930s… the Soviet Union was the only major power without mass unemployment or homelessness. It had achieved, in less than two decades, what took the West two centuries of colonial blood.” This represents a strongly positive, celebratory view of Stalin‑era industrialization and its speed compared to Western development.