“Under Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), Title VII's anti-retaliation provision covers any employer action that a reasonable employee would find materially adverse.”

The anti-retaliation provisions make it unlawful to take a materially adverse action against an individual because of protected activity. The Supreme Court held in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), that a "materially adverse action" subject to challenge under the anti-retaliation provisions encompasses a broader range of actions than an "adverse action" subject to challenge under the non-discrimination provisions. [100] In light of the purpose of anti-retaliation protection, it expansively covers any employer action that "might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination." [101]1. General Rule The anti-retaliation provisions make it unlawful to take a materially adverse action against an individual because of protected activity. The Supreme Court held in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), that a "materially adverse action" subject to challenge under the anti-retaliation provisions encompasses a broader range of actions than an "adverse action" subject to challenge under the non-discrimination provisions. [100] In light of the purpose of anti-retaliation protection, it expansively covers any employer action that "might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination." [101] An action need not be materially adverse standing alone, as long as the employer's retaliatory conduct, considered as a whole, would deter protected activity. [102] Although "normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners will not create such deterrence," the standard can be satisfied even if the individual was not in fact deterred. [103]

In a 9-0 decision with one justice concurring, the Court held that the statute's retaliation provision encompasses any employer action that "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant." … Instead, the Court established a standard that requires an employee to demonstrate that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action to be materially adverse.Employment Discrimination and Retaliation Claims: A Legal Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White In June 2006, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 1 a case that involved questions about the scope of the retaliation provision under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 In a 9-0 decision with one justice concurring, the Court held that the statute's retaliation provision encompasses any employer action that "would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant." 3 This standard, which is much broader than a standard that would have confined the retaliation provision to actions that affect only the terms and conditions of employment, generally makes it easier to sue employers if they retaliate against workers who complain about discrimination. Under the Court's interpretation, employees must establish only that the employer's actions might dissuade a worker from making a charge of discrimination. … 20 Given these differences in both the language and purpose of the statute, the Court ultimately held that the retaliation provision is not limited to employer actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment. Instead, the Court established a standard that requires an employee to demonstrate that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action to be materially adverse. Noting that Title VII's retaliation provision does not protect an employee from the "petty slights or minor annoyances" of the workplace, 21 the Court stated that a challenged action must be significant enough to dissuade the average worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The Court also emphasized that the context matters when determining whether an employer's action rises to the level of retaliation. …

We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. … The anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Appeals have used differing language to describe the level of seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ”… Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope? We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. This case arises out of actions that supervisors at petitioner Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company took against respondent Sheila White, the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way department at Burlington’s Tennessee Yard. In June 1997, Burlington’s roadmaster, Marvin Brown, interviewed White and expressed interest in her previous experience operating forklifts. … The scope of the anti-retaliation provision extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts and harm. We therefore reject the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated the anti-retaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the anti-discrimination provision and that have limited actionable retaliation to so-called “ultimate employment decisions.” See supra, at 5. The anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Appeals have used differing language to describe the level of seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F. 3d, at 662). We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998); see Faragher, 524 U. …

Rather, the Court held that in order to fall under the 10 “discriminate against” language, an employer’s actions need only be “materially adverse” to a reasonable employee or applicant. … The Court then concluded, following the reasoning 82 of the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, that the anti-retaliation 83 “provision covers those . . . employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. . . . [T]hat means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a 2008] BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE 487 reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”10. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414 (2006). 11. Id. at 2415. 12. Russell Adler, Employers, Beware: Supreme Court Decision Changes the Playing Field, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 5, Aug. 29, 2006, at 5 (discussing the potential expansiveness of the Burlington standard). 13. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring). 14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). to hire someone. Rather, the Court held that in order to fall under the 10 “discriminate against” language, an employer’s actions need only be “materially adverse” to a reasonable employee or applicant. 11 This decision, of course, did not bode well with employers. Employers complained about the difficulty in predicting future liability, citing the lack of clarity in the Court’s explanation of what actions “discriminate against” employees. Employers were not alone. Justice Alito filed a concurring 12 opinion, questioning the clarity of the majority’s standard and the difficulty in applying that standard. … Finally, the Court reasoned that Title VII depends on employees 80 who are willing to stand up to employers and file complaints, and that a broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, which in turn gives more protection to these employees, would encourage such behavior. 81 Ultimately, the Court held that the entire “retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace.” The Court then concluded, following the reasoning 82 of the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, that the anti-retaliation 83 “provision covers those . . . employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. . . . [T]hat means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a 2008] BURLINGTON NORTHERN V. WHITE 487 reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” The 84 Court reasoned that the materiality aspect of its holding “served to separate significant from trivial harms.” “The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent 85 employer interference with ‘unfettered access’ to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms . . . by prohibiting employer actions that are likely ‘to deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the EEOC,’ the courts, and their employers.” …

We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. … In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, "which in this context means it well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' "… Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope? We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer's actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. I … ## B The anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Appeals have used differing language to describe the level of seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, "which in this context means it well might have 'dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.' " Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F. 3d, at 662). We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth "a general civility code for the American workplace." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998); see Faragher, 524 U. …

2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the challenged action “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219.… Neither this Court’s precedent nor the EEOC’s interpretations support a contrary conclusion. Nor is it anomalous to read the statute to provide broader protection for retaliation victims than for victims of discrimination. Congress has provided similar protection from retaliation in comparable statutes. And differences in the purpose of the two Title VII provisions remove any perceived “anomaly,” for they justify this difference in interpretation. Pp. 6–12. 2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the challenged action “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ” Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219. The Court refers to material adversity to separate significant from trivial harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer interference with “unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter discrimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. …

2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. … The Court refers to material adversity to separate significant from trivial Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 Syllabus harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer in terference with ìunfettered accessî to Title VIIís remedial mecha nisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter dis crimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers.… Neither this Courtís precedent nor the EEOCís interpretations support a contrary conclusion. Nor is it anomalous to read the statute to provide broader protection for retaliation victims than for victims of discrimination. Congress has provided similar protection from retaliation in comparable statutes. And differences in the purpose of the two Title VII provisions remove any perceived ìanomaly,î for they justify this difference in interpretation. Pp. 6ñ12. 2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Co lumbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the challenged action ìwell might have ëdis suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.íî Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219. The Court refers to material adversity to separate significant from trivial Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 Syllabus harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer in terference with ìunfettered accessî to Title VIIís remedial mecha nisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter dis crimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. The Court refers to a reasonable employeeís reactions because the provisionís standard for judging harm must be objective, and thus judicially administrable. The stan dard is phrased in general terms because the significance of any given act of retaliation may depend upon the particular circum stances. Pp. 12ñ15. 3. Applying the standard to the facts of this case, there was a suffi cient evidentiary basis to support the juryís verdict on Whiteís re taliation claim. …

Retaliation includes any employer action that is "materially adverse." This means any action that might deter a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity. … Whether an action is materially adverse depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that transferring a worker to a harder, dirtier job within the same pay grade, and suspending her without pay for more than a month (even though the pay was later reimbursed) were both "materially adverse actions" that could be challenged as retaliation.8. When is an employer action serious enough to be retaliation? Retaliation includes any employer action that is "materially adverse." This means any action that might deter a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity. "Materially adverse" actions include more than employment actions such as denial of promotion, non-hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, suspension, discharge, or other actions that can be challenged directly as employment discrimination. Retaliation can be an employer action that is work-related, or one that has no tangible effect on employment, or even an action that takes place exclusively outside of work, as long as it may well dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in protected activity. Whether an action is materially adverse depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that transferring a worker to a harder, dirtier job within the same pay grade, and suspending her without pay for more than a month (even though the pay was later reimbursed) were both "materially adverse actions" that could be challenged as retaliation. The Supreme Court has also said that actionable retaliation includes: the FBI's refusing to investigate death threats against an agent; the filing of false criminal charges against a former employee; changing the work schedule of a parent who has caretaking responsibilities for school-age children; and excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that contributes to professional advancement.

We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a rea sonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. … In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of ”discrimination.’… Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope? We conclude that the antiretaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a rea sonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. I A This case arises out of actions that supervisors at peti tioner Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company took against respondent Sheila White, the only woman work ing in the Maintenance of Way department at Burlington’s Tennessee Yard. In June 1997, Burlington’s roadmaster, Marvin Brown, interviewed White and expressed interest in her previous experience operating forklifts. … B The antiretaliation provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Ap peals have used differing language to describe the level of seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of ”discrimination.’ Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1219(quoting Wash ington, 420 F. 3d, at 662). We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Off shore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998);see Faragher, 524 U. …

2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Co lumbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the challenged action ìwell might have ëdis suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.íî Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219.… Neither this Courtís precedent nor the EEOCís interpretations support a contrary conclusion. Nor is it anomalous to read the statute to provide broader protection for retaliation victims than for victims of discrimination. Congress has provided similar protection from retaliation in comparable statutes. And differences in the purpose of the two Title VII provisions remove any perceived ìanomaly,î for they justify this difference in interpretation. Pp. 6ñ12. 2. The anti-retaliation provision covers only those employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or applicant. This Court agrees with the Seventh and District of Co lumbia Circuits that the proper formulation requires a retaliation plaintiff to show that the challenged action ìwell might have ëdis suaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.íî Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F. 3d 1211, 1219. The Court refers to material adversity to separate significant from trivial Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 Syllabus harms. The anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent employer in terference with ìunfettered accessî to Title VIIís remedial mecha nisms by prohibiting employer actions that are likely to deter dis crimination victims from complaining to the EEOC, the courts, and employers. Robinson, supra, at 346. …

We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. … In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’”… against.” Does that provision confine actionable retaliation to activity that affects the terms and conditions of employment? And how harmful must the adverse actions be to fall within its scope? We conclude that the anti-retaliation provision does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are 2 BURLINGTON N. & S. F. R. CO. v. WHITE Opinion of the Court related to employment or occur at the workplace. We also conclude that the provision covers those (and only those) employer actions that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job applicant. In the present context that means that the employer’s actions must be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. I A This case arises out of actions that supervisors at petitioner Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Company took against respondent Sheila White, the only woman working in the Maintenance of Way department at Burlington’s Tennessee Yard. In June 1997, Burlington’s roadmaster, Marvin Brown, interviewed White and expressed interest in her previous experience operating forklifts. Burlington hired White as a “track laborer,” a … See supra, at 5. B The anti-retaliation provision protects an individual not Cite as: 548 U. S. ____ (2006) 13 Opinion of the Court from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or harm. As we have explained, the Courts of Appeals have used differing language to describe the level of seriousness to which this harm must rise before it becomes actionable retaliation. We agree with the formulation set forth by the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuits. In our view, a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, “which in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’” Rochon, 438 F. 3d, at 1219 (quoting Washington, 420 F. 3d, at 662). We speak of material adversity because we believe it is important to separate significant from trivial harms. Title VII, we have said, does not set forth “a general civility code for the American workplace.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 80 (1998); see Faragher, 524 U. S., at 788 (judicial standards for sexual harassment must “filter out complaints attacking ‘the …

In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."Samuel A. Alito, Jr. Alito Yes. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that White suffered retaliatory discrimination when she was reassigned to less desirable duties and suspended without pay. Though the duties were within the same classification and the pay was eventually reinstated, the action was nevertheless sufficiently harsh to constitute retaliatory discrimination. In a decision authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and six other justices, the Court held that in order to prevail on a claim of retaliatory discrimination, "a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." (internal citations omitted) Justice Samuel Alito wrote separately, agreeing with the result but arguing that the test adopted by the other members of the Court would eventually prove problematic.

We therefore reject White’s and the EEOC’s request that we adopt a new definition of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII retaliation cases, and we reaffirm the definition that we have developed in cases such as Kocsis and its progeny. … Instead, I believe that the appropriate standard is the one articulated in the Ninth Circuit and advocated by the EEOC; i.e., an employer’s retaliatory action is sufficiently adverse for § 704(a) purposes if it would be “reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected activity.”… Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 756, 758-60 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (holding that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is not limited to discrimination affecting employment). It is unnecessary for us to resolve the question addressed in Passer and Outback Steakhouse because the actions at issue in the present case (job transfer and suspension) clearly affect employment. We therefore reject White’s and the EEOC’s request that we adopt a new definition of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII retaliation cases, and we reaffirm the definition that we have developed in cases such as Kocsis and its progeny. Since the adverse-employment action element developed by this Circuit is an exception to a broad, strictly literal reading of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions, we will continue to define the exception narrowly so as not to frustrate the purpose of Title VII while deterring lawsuits over trivial matters. B. Suspension Without Pay We now apply our definition of adverse employment action to the actions at issue in the present case. We consider the suspension first. … Vanderbilt Univ., 185 F.3d 542, 545-46 (6th Cir. 1999), I would be remiss if I failed to point out that such an express rejection of the “ultimate employment action” doctrine effectively overrules Dobbs-Weinstein. I write separately, however, because I disagree with the rule the majority today embraces with respect to what constitutes an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a). Instead, I believe that the appropriate standard is the one articulated in the Ninth Circuit and advocated by the EEOC; i.e., an employer’s retaliatory action is sufficiently adverse for § 704(a) purposes if it would be “reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 2000). The “reasonably likely to deter” standard is more consistent with § 704(a)’sstatutory language and congressional intent, as well as Supreme Court case law. Nos. 00-6780; 01-5024 White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co.

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-manage ment committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or ap plicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici pated in any manner in an investigation, pro ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.Subversive Activities Control Board established by act Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, §12, 64 Stat. 977, and ceased to operate on June 30, 1973. § 2000e–3. Other unlawful employment practices (a) Discrimination for making charges, testi fying, assisting, or participating in enforce ment proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-manage ment committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or ap plicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici pated in any manner in an investigation, pro ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. (b) Printing or publication of notices or adver tisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination; occupational qualification exception It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employ ment agency, or joint labor-management com mittee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or adver tisement …

§ 2000e–3. Other unlawful employment practices (a) Discrimination for making charges, testi fying, assisting, or participating in enforce ment proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-manage ment committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or ap plicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici pated in any manner in an investigation, pro ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.Subversive Activities Control Board established by act Sept. 23, 1950, ch. 1024, §12, 64 Stat. 977, and ceased to operate on June 30, 1973. § 2000e–3. Other unlawful employment practices (a) Discrimination for making charges, testi fying, assisting, or participating in enforce ment proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-manage ment committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or ap plicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or partici pated in any manner in an investigation, pro ceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. (b) Printing or publication of notices or adver tisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination; occupational qualification exception It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employ ment agency, or joint labor-management com mittee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or adver tisement …

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.… [Print][Print selection] [OLRC Home]Help UPDATED THROUGH PUB. L. 119-1. 42 USC 2000e-3: Other unlawful employment practicesText contains those laws in effect on February 13, 2025 From Title 42-THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARECHAPTER 21-CIVIL RIGHTSSUBCHAPTER VI-EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES Jump To:Source CreditMiscellaneousAmendments §2000e–3. Other unlawful employment practices (a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. (b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination; occupational qualification exception …

Supreme Court decisions handed down after issuance of the EEOC’s 1998 Compliance Manual that concern retaliation under EEOC-enforced laws include: University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011); Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011); Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); and Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). … Retaliation occurs when an employer takes a materially adverse action because an individual has engaged in, or may engage in, activity in furtherance of the EEO laws the Commission enforces.1 Supreme Court decisions handed down after issuance of the EEOC’s 1998 Compliance Manual that concern retaliation under EEOC-enforced laws include: University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1 (2011); Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 (2011); Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 555 U.S. 271 (2009); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474 (2008); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006); and Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001). 2 Beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2009, charges of retaliation surpassed race discrimination as the most frequently alleged basis of discrimination. In FY 2015, retaliation claims were included in 44.5% of all charges received by the EEOC, and 35.7% of the Title VII charges received. See Charge Statistics, FY 1997 Through FY 2015, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Aug. 18, 2016). 3 … ## B. Overview Retaliation occurs when an employer takes a materially adverse action because an individual has engaged in, or may engage in, activity in furtherance of the EEO laws the Commission enforces. The EEO anti-retaliation provisions ensure that individuals are free to raise complaints of potential EEO violations or engage in other EEO activity without employers taking materially adverse actions in response. Retaliation occurs when an employer takes a materially adverse action because an individual has engaged, or may engage, in activity in furtherance of the EEO laws the Commission enforces.

The anti-retaliation provision (42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a)) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. … In this case the standard for retaliation against a sexual harassment complainant was revised to include any adverse employment decision or treatment that would be likely to dissuade a "reasonable worker" from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.… v. White Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White Supreme Court of the United States Argued April 17, 2006 Decided June 22, 2006 Full case name · Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, Petitioner v. Sheila White Docket no. · 05-259 Citations · 548 U.S. 53 (more) 126 S. Ct. 2405; 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 Case history Prior · White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004). Holding The anti-retaliation provision (42 U. S. C. §2000e–3(a)) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not confine the actions and harms it forbids to those that are related to employment or occur at the workplace. Court membership Chief Justice John Roberts Associate Justices John P. Stevens · Antonin Scalia Anthony Kennedy · David Souter Clarence Thomas · Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stephen Breyer · Samuel Alito Case opinions Majority · Breyer, joined by Roberts, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg Concurrence · Alito (in judgment) Laws applied Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 42 U. S. C. §2000e-2(a); Burlington Northern & Santa Fe (BNSF) Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), is a US labor law case of the United States Supreme Court on sexual harassment and retaliatory discrimination. It was a landmark case for retaliation claims. [1] [2] [3] It set a precedent for claims which could be considered retaliatory under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. [4] [5] In this case the standard for retaliation against a sexual harassment complainant was revised to include any adverse employment decision or treatment that would be likely to dissuade a "reasonable worker" from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Facts

We therefore reject White's and the EEOC's request that we adopt a new definition of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII retaliation cases, and we reaffirm the definition that we have developed in cases such as Kocsis and its progeny. … Instead, I believe that the appropriate standard is the one articulated in the Ninth Circuit and advocated by the EEOC; i.e., an employer's retaliatory action is sufficiently adverse for § 704(a) purposes if it would be “reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected activity.” … In 1999, a panel of this Court held that an adverse employment action, for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, must materially affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662.… Mattei, 126 F.3d 794, 806 (6th Cir.1997) (presuming that Congress intended the phrase “discriminate against” to have the same basic meaning each time it is used in a statute).5 We therefore reject White's and the EEOC's request that we adopt a new definition of adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII retaliation cases, and we reaffirm the definition that we have developed in cases such as Kocsis and its progeny. Since the adverse-employment action element developed by this Circuit is an exception to a broad, strictly literal reading of Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions, we will continue to define the exception narrowly so as not to frustrate the purpose of Title VII while deterring lawsuits over trivial matters. B. … I write separately, however, because I disagree with the rule the majority today embraces with respect to what constitutes an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C.2000e-3(a). Instead, I believe that the appropriate standard is the one articulated in the Ninth Circuit and advocated by the EEOC; i.e., an employer's retaliatory action is sufficiently adverse for § 704(a) purposes if it would be “reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected activity.” Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1242-43 (9th Cir.2000). The “reasonably likely to deter” standard is more consistent with § 704(a)'s statutory language and congressional intent, as well as Supreme Court case law. A. Why the “Reasonably Likely to Deter” Rule is the Appropriate Standard for a Retaliation Case … C. Conclusion In 1999, a panel of this Court held that an adverse employment action, for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim, must materially affect the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment. Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662. Our grant of the petition for rehearing en banc provided this Court with an opportunity to reconsider the validity of Hollins' unreasoned importation of § 703(a)'s definition of an “adverse employment action” into § 704(a) and to clarify what actions are sufficiently adverse with respect to retaliation claims. …

With this appeal, we examine whether actions taken by the Appellant Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. (“Burlington Northern” or “railroad”) were sufficiently adverse employment actions to sustain a cause of action under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). … “[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII.”OPINION With this appeal, we examine whether actions taken by the Appellant Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. (“Burlington Northern” or “railroad”) were sufficiently adverse employment actions to sustain a cause of action under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). We also review whether the district court erred when it denied the Burlington Northern's motion for judgment as a matter of a law. In making that motion, Appellant Burlington Northern argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the retaliation claim. Finally, we decide if the district court abused its discretion when awarding attorney's fees 1 to the plaintiff. … On appeal, Burlington Northern says White did not establish that the reassignment of the forklift responsibilities and her temporary suspension were “adverse employment actions.” “[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII.” Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662 (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir.1996) and Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). A material adverse change includes a termination in employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. …

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. (b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination; occupational qualification exception

LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White … Section 2000e-3(a) forbids an employer from “discriminating against” an employee because she opposed an “unlawful employment practice.” In this case, the Supreme Court must determine what constitutes retaliatory discrimination so that it is actionable under § 2000e-3(a).Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White LII note: The U.S Supreme Court has now decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. White … ## Discussion Section 2000e-3(a) forbids an employer from “discriminating against” an employee because she opposed an “unlawful employment practice.” In this case, the Supreme Court must determine what constitutes retaliatory discrimination so that it is actionable under § 2000e-3(a). The circuit courts have identified three conflicting standards: (i) any “materially adverse change in the terms of employment,” including an inconvenient reassignment or even a temporary suspension rescinded by the employer with full back pay, White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co.,364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004); (ii) any adverse treatment “ reasonably likely to deter” the plaintiff from engaging in protected activity, as the Ninth Circuit holds, see Ray v. …

(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.2024 U.S. Code Title 42 - The Public Health and Welfare Chapter 21 - Civil Rights Subchapter VI - Equal Employment Opportunities Sec. 2000e-3 - Other unlawful employment practices Citation · 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2024) Section Name · §2000e–3. Other unlawful employment practices Section Text · (a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying, assisting, or participating in enforcement proceedings It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. (b) Printing or publication of notices or advertisements indicating prohibited preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination; occupational qualification exception It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or published any notice or advertisement …

With this appeal, we examine whether actions taken by the Appellant Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. ("Burlington Northern" or "railroad") were sufficiently adverse employment actions to sustain a cause of action under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). … On appeal, Burlington Northern says White did not establish that the reassignment of the forklift responsibilities and her temporary suspension were "adverse employment actions." "[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII."GWIN, District Judge. With this appeal, we examine whether actions taken by the Appellant Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. ("Burlington Northern" or "railroad") were sufficiently adverse employment actions to sustain a cause of action under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). We also review whether the district court erred when it denied the Burlington Northern's motion for judgment as a matter of a law. In making that motion, Appellant Burlington Northern argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the retaliation claim. Finally, we decide if the district court abused its discretion when awarding attorney's fees 1 to the plaintiff. … St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (internal citation omitted). Once the employer produces such evidence, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the reasons the employer offered were a pretext for retaliation. See id. The plaintiff at all times retains the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer intentionally retaliated in violation of Title VII. See id. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. 2742. On appeal, Burlington Northern says White did not establish that the reassignment of the forklift responsibilities and her temporary suspension were "adverse employment actions." "[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII." Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662 (citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir.1996) and Crady v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Indiana, 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir.1993)). A material adverse change includes a termination in employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. …

The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the holding that the rail yard illegally retaliated against Ms. White. In addition to ruling against Ms. White’s employer, the Supreme Court also adopted an expansive standard by which courts will evaluate such claims in the future, as urged in an amicus brief.Decision The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the holding that the rail yard illegally retaliated against Ms. White. In addition to ruling against Ms. White’s employer, the Supreme Court also adopted an expansive standard by which courts will evaluate such claims in the future, as urged in an amicus brief. 32 Broadway, Suite 1801