The U.S. intelligence community identified Bin Ladin as a threat well before the attacks of September 11, 2001. … Yet no one in the intelligence community connected the collective dots. … Operational failures… included “not watchlisting future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar, not trailing them after they traveled to Bangkok, and not informing the FBI about one future hijacker's U.S. visa or his companion's travel to the United States; not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar.”

During the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings about an attack al Qaeda planned, as one report puts it “something very, very, very big.” Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told us “the system was blinking red.” … Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York. … The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise. Islamic extremists had given plenty of warnings that they meant to kill Americans indiscriminately and in large numbers.

Finding: While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. Nonetheless, the Community did have information that was clearly relevant to the September 11 attacks, particularly when considered for its collective significance. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future.

"As of this date, the Joint Inquiry Staff has determined from the fruits of these efforts that, prior to September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community possessed no intelligence or law enforcement information linking 16 of the 19 hijackers to terrorism or terrorist groups." The statement indicates that for 3 of the 19 hijackers, some intelligence or law enforcement information linking them to terrorism did exist prior to 9/11, but not for the other 16.

"CIA and FBI counterterrorism operations and investigations prior to September 11, 2001 repeatedly produced intelligence relating to two individuals in Hamburg, Germany – Mamoun Darkazanli, a suspected logistician in Bin Ladin’s network, and Mohammed Zammar, a suspected recruiter for al-Qa’ida." The report also states: "Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community had information linking Khalid Shaykh Mohammed (KSM), now recognized by the Intelligence Community as the mastermind of the attacks, to Bin Ladin, to terrorist plans to use aircraft as weapons, and to terrorist activity in the United States." It further notes a stream of reporting from 1998 through mid-2001 that Bin Ladin supporters were planning to infiltrate the United States to conduct terrorist operations and that an al-Qa’ida associate was considering mounting terrorist attacks within the United States.

1. Finding: While the Intelligence Community had amassed a great deal of valuable intelligence regarding Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorist activities, none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001. Finding: During the spring and summer of 2001, the Intelligence Community experienced a significant increase in information indicating that Bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida intended to strike against U.S. interests in the very near future. Critical parts of the information concerning al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi lay dormant within the Intelligence Community for as long as eighteen months, at the very time when plans for the September 11 attacks were proceeding. The CIA missed repeated opportunities to act based on information in its possession that these two Bin Ladin-associated terrorists were traveling to the United States, and to add their names to watchlists.

The 9/11 Commission stated that "the threat of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States—and using them as guided missiles—was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11." It described that while there was awareness of al-Qaeda’s interest in hijacking, U.S. defenses did not anticipate the specific method of using planes as weapons inside the U.S. The report overall found numerous failures in sharing and acting upon intelligence about al-Qaeda and some of the hijackers before 9/11.

In January 2000, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) succeeded in determining that Bin Laden operatives Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were in Malaysia and in obtaining important information about them. While some information regarding the two was provided to the FBI at an early point, the weight of the evidence suggests that the CIA apparently did not transmit information regarding al-Mihdhar's possession of a U.S. multiple-entry visa and the likelihood of travel by al-Mihdhar, and later by al-Hazmi, to the United States, despite various opportunities to do so in January 2000, March 2000, and June 2001. It was not until late August 2001 that the CIA watch-listed al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi and advised the FBI of their likely presence in the United States. FBI efforts to locate them through the New York and Los Angeles FBI offices proved unsuccessful.

The Justice Department Inspector General’s review notes that "despite these ongoing discussions and opportunities for the FBI to learn about and focus on Mihdhar and Hazmi, including their presence in the United States, the FBI was not made aware of and did not connect important details about them until late August 2001, a short time before" the attacks. It details that CIA officers knew of Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi’s U.S. visas and later their presence in the United States, but this information was not promptly shared with the FBI, which limited the Bureau’s ability to investigate them before 9/11.

The DOJ Inspector General report on FBI intelligence handling explains that it examined "allegations that the FBI failed to act prior to September 11, 2001, on intelligence information that warned of potential terrorists training in aviation-related fields of study in the United States." It describes the July 2001 "Phoenix memo," in which FBI agent Kenneth Williams wrote that he believed there was "a coordinated effort by Usama Bin Laden to send students to the United States to attend civil aviation universities and colleges," but this memo did not lead to a broader national investigation before the attacks.

FBI employees received verbal briefings on Mihdhar from CIA employees in the FBI’s Strategic Information Operations Center (SIOC) around the time of the Millennium threat. However, information was soon discovered that had been in the possession of the FBI and the Intelligence Community before September 11 that related to the hijacking of airplanes by extremists or that involved the terrorists who committed the September 11 attacks. With regard to Hazmi and Mihdhar, the FBI had at least five opportunities to uncover information that could have informed the FBI about these two terrorists’ presence in the United States and led the FBI to seek to find them before September 11, 2001.

In conducting our review, OIG investigators also learned that prior to the September 11 attacks the Intelligence Community had acquired a significant amount of intelligence about two of the hijackers – Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar. Well before September 11, 2001, the Intelligence Community had discovered that Hazmi and Mihdhar had met with other al Qaeda operatives in Malaysia in January 2000. The CIA also had discovered that Mihdhar possessed a valid U.S visa and that Hazmi had traveled to the United States in January 2000. However, the CIA did not notify the FBI about Mihdhar’s U.S. visa or Hazmi’s travel to the United States at that time, and neither individual was placed on the State Department’s TIPOFF watchlist until August 2001.

The distinction is important because, so far as the Inquiry has been able to determine to date, the Intelligence Community did have general indications of a possible terrorist attack against the United States or U.S. interests overseas in the spring and summer of 2001 and promulgated strategic warnings. However, it does not appear to date that the Intelligence Community had information prior to September 11 that identified precisely where, when and how the attacks were to be carried out. Our review confirmed that, shortly after Usama Bin Ladin's May 1998 press conference, the Intelligence Community began to acquire intelligence information indicating that Bin Ladin's network intended to strike inside the United States.

A staff statement to the 9/11 Commission notes: "Before 9/11, the FBI and CIA did know of some of the practices employed by al Qaeda. They knew this from training manuals recovered in the mid-1990s and from tracking and interrogations of al Qaeda operatives." The statement focuses on the entry of the hijackers into the U.S. and indicates that although general al-Qaeda methods were known, the agencies failed to connect that knowledge to the specific individuals who would later become the hijackers as they entered and moved within the United States.

At this point, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was aware of al-Mihdhar, and he was photographed in Malaysia with another al-Qaeda member who was involved in the bombing of the USS Cole. The CIA was aware of al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi's involvement with al-Qaeda, having been informed by Saudi intelligence during a 1999 meeting in Riyadh. Despite knowledge of his entry into the United States for over a year, al-Mihdhar was not placed on a CIA watchlist until 21 August 2001, and a note was sent on 23 August to the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suggesting that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi be added to their watchlists.

Based on information uncovered by the FBI in the 1998 United States embassy bombings case, the National Security Agency (NSA) began tracking the communications of al-Mihdhar's father-in-law, Ahmad Muhammad Ali al-Hada, who was facilitating al-Qaeda communications, in 1999. Authorities also became aware of al-Hazmi, as a friend and associate of al-Mihdhar. On 23 August, Israeli Mossad reportedly gave his name to the CIA as one of 19 belonging to US residents who they said were planning to attack the United States in the near future. The CIA reportedly received al-Hazmi's name on a list of 19 persons suspected of planning an attack in the near future.

Government officials were advised by the Intelligence Community on June 28 and July 10, 2001, that the attacks were expected, among other things, to "have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties" and that "[a]ttack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning." We issued between January and September nine warnings, five of them global, because of the threat information we were receiving from the intelligence agencies in the summer, when [DCI] George Tenet was around town saying, "It’s not a question of whether, but when" an attack would occur.

Reporting on congressional investigators’ findings, the article states that "the CIA failed repeatedly before Sept. 11 to share key information with the FBI about two Al Qaeda suspects who became hijackers in last year’s attacks, even after learning the men held U.S. visas, were in the United States, and had links to the bombing of the destroyer Cole." It quotes the Joint Inquiry’s report: "In short, the report concluded, ‘the CIA had obtained information identifying two of the 19 hijackers ... as suspected terrorists carrying visas for travel to the United States as long as 18 months’ before placing them on watch lists."

Through a collaborative effort within the IC, the CIA received information that a meeting of individuals possibly associated with Usama Bin Laden's (UBL) terrorist network took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in early January 2000. Among those attending the meeting were Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, along with a key UBL operative. At the time al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were arriving in Malaysia, the CIA advised the FBI of their interest in these two individuals and indicated they would keep the FBI advised of further developments if warranted. Later, the CIA learned that Mihdhar possessed a multiple-entry U.S. visa and that Hazmi had traveled to the United States, but this information was not promptly shared with the FBI.

The Council on Foreign Relations summary of the 9/11 Commission findings notes that the intelligence community had a "significant increase" in intelligence information regarding Osama bin Laden and a potential terrorist attack, but "too often failed to focus on that information and to capitalize on available and potentially important information." It states: "No. The FBI and the CIA failed to share key clues before the attacks," in response to whether the FBI missed clues prior to September 11, emphasizing that inter-agency failures contributed to the inability to act on threats involving future hijackers.

Two of the passengers had been identified as al-Qaeda members and were on the FBI's terrorist-alert list prior to 9/11: Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi. CIA operatives reportedly monitored the movements of these two known militants when they visited the US but did not notify the FBI or gain an inkling of what the hijackers were planning. However, during a 2006 Moussaoui trial cross-examination, FBI agents stated that the bureau was aware, years before the attacks in 2001, that al-Qaeda planned to use planes to destroy important buildings.

PBS reports that "the White House confirmed ... that the CIA had warned President Bush last August that members of Osama bin Laden's terrorist network might try to hijack U.S. airplanes." It adds: "It is important to note that this was nonspecific threat that mentioned hijacking," and that domestic agencies such as the Department of Transportation and FAA were made aware of general information mentioning hijackings, but "did not include specific and detailed warnings."

By the spring of 2000, the Bin Laden Issue Station learned that Khalid al-Mihdhar… and Nawaf al-Hazmi… had entered the U.S. and were living under their own names in Southern California. Miller wanted to inform the FBI of their entry and presence in the U.S., but the CIA blocked Miller's efforts to do so. … Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were both hijackers of American Airlines Flight 77. … The CIA then failed to reveal to the commission that over a year before the attack, it had been tracking the two hijackers’ entry into and whereabouts inside the United States.

The Joint Inquiry report criticized failings of the FBI and CIA to use available information, including about terrorists the CIA knew were in the United States, in order to disrupt the plots. The Washington Post reported in May 2002 that Representative Goss dismissed as "a lot of nonsense" reports that five weeks before the attacks a CIA briefing had alerted President Bush about possible Osama bin Laden associates' plans to hijack aircraft; he said the investigation focus would be on why the United States intelligence bureaucracy composed of 13 agencies failed to detect the hijackers. The report catalogued multiple instances where the CIA knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi had entered the United States, yet this information was not effectively used to locate them or to link them to the wider plot.

The Intelligence Community did have general indications of a possible terrorist attack against the United States or U.S. interests overseas in the spring and summer of 2001 and promulgated strategic warnings. However, it does not appear to date that the Intelligence Community had information prior to September 11 that identified precisely where, when and how the attacks were to be carried out. The Inquiry also addressed the question of three of the hijackers who had come to the attention of the Intelligence Community prior to September 11, 2001. (Except for two who had received speeding tickets, none of the hijackers had come to the attention of law enforcement agencies.)

Encyclopaedia Britannica’s discussion of the 9/11 Commission findings notes: "The commission found that the key pre-September 11 failure at the CIA was its not adding to the State Department’s ‘watch list’ two of the ‘muscle’ hijackers ... Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar." It further explains that "The CIA also did not alert the FBI about the identities of the suspected terrorists, which could have helped the bureau locate them once they were inside the United States." This underscores that the CIA had information about these future hijackers as suspected terrorists but did not fully act on or share it.

U.S. intelligence agencies knew the identity of the hijacker in question, Saudi national Khalid al Mihdhar, long before 9/11 and had the opportunity to track his movements. Mihdhar was on the intelligence community’s radar at least as early as 1999. That’s when the NSA had picked up communications from a ‘terrorist facility’ in the Mideast suggesting that members of an ‘operational cadre’ were planning to travel to Kuala Lumpur in January 2000, according to the commission report. The U.S. got photos of those attending the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia, including of Mihdhar, and the CIA also learned that his passport had a visa for travel to the U.S. But that fact was not shared with FBI headquarters until much later, in August 2001, which proved too late.

It turns out that the NSA was intercepting calls to the al Qaeda safe house in Yemen as early as 1999, and both the FBI and CIA knew Mihdhar was an al Qaeda operative long before the 9/11 attacks. Though they lost him in Thailand, as Mueller suggested, the CIA knew he had a visa to enter the United States and that his travel companion and fellow hijacker, Nawaf al Hazmi, had a plane ticket to fly to Los Angeles. The NSA continued intercepting communications to and from that safe house and U.S. intelligence agencies knew Khalid al Mihdhar was in the United States by August 22, 2001.

The report has been accused of not giving the whole story about the warnings the U.S. received prior to the attacks. While the report did describe that “the system was blinking red” and that an al-Qaeda attack was imminent, it did not include the testimony of former CIA director George Tenet to the commission in January 2004, in which he claimed to have given a specific warning to the Administration in a July 2001 meeting with Condoleezza Rice. … According to the report, “The 9/11 attacks were a shock, but they should not have come as a surprise.”

The Levin Center’s overview of the Joint Inquiry states that the report found that "none of it identified the time, place, and specific nature of the attacks that were planned for September 11, 2001," although intelligence suggesting an attack on U.S. interests had increased substantially in the months prior. It notes: "Although some intelligence agencies had been aware that some of the hijackers were in the United States, and even had contact with several, the report found that the agencies had failed to appreciate the threat and did not detain the hijackers or add them to a watchlist to prevent their entry into the country."

On May 1, 2001, the CIA informed the White House that "a group presently in the United States" was in the process of planning a terrorist attack. On August 6, 2001, the President's Daily Briefing, titled "Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US", warned that bin Laden was planning to exploit his operatives' access to the U.S. to mount a terrorist strike: FBI information "indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country, consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attack." Since 1999, information about the hijackers and the preparations for the eventual attack already held by the NSA and the CIA wasn't passed to the FBI until August 2001, primarily due to communications lapses between the agencies and the erroneous belief that said attacks wouldn't happen on US soil, but overseas. On 23 August 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of 19 suspects living in the US who were believed to be mounting an imminent attack on the United States, including four eventual hijackers.

The Joint Inquiry of 2002 confirmed that the Intelligence Community had received at least twelve reports over a seven-year period suggesting that terrorists might use planes as weapons. After briefly discussing each of them, it says that “The CIA disseminated several of these reports to the FBI and to agencies responsible for preventive actions. They included the FAA.” … The FBI had advance indications of plans to hijack U.S. airliners and use them as weapons, but neither acted on them nor distributed the intelligence to local police agencies. … The 9/11 Commission Report states that “during the spring and summer of 2001, U.S. intelligence agencies received a stream of warnings about an attack al-Qaeda planned, as one report puts it ‘something very, very, very big.’”

In December 1998, the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center reported to President Bill Clinton that al-Qaeda was preparing for attacks in the U.S. that might include hijacking aircraft. … On 23 August 2001, the Mossad gave the CIA a list of 19 suspects living in the US who were believed to be mounting an imminent attack on the United States. Only four of the names are known, all belonging to eventual hijackers in the attacks — Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi. … It is not known if the list had 19 names by coincidence or if it had all the hijackers who would partake in the attacks.