Underscoring the seriousness of these issues are the conclusions of retired Army Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, who was asked last year to review the method for tracking the Defense Department’s most sensitive programs. Vines, who once commanded all U.S. ground forces in Iraq, was stunned by what he discovered. "I’m not aware of any agency with the authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all the interagency and commercial activities," he said in an interview. "That’s what struck me."

The Harvard Law Review article "Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space" discusses that "Interagency coordination is one of the great challenges of modern governance" and notes that Congress, the President, and agencies have a variety of tools at their disposal to manage coordination challenges effectively, including agency interaction requirements, formal interagency agreements, and joint policymaking. This indicates that coordination is recognized as difficult and often fragmented rather than handled by a single overarching authority.

The Department of Defense document "Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations" notes that in many situations, participating agencies and organizations must cooperate to obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays and that unity of effort is achieved when all actions are directed to a common purpose. It also states that because DOD will often be in a supporting role, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies and organizations, implying that responsibility and coordination are distributed rather than centralized in a single agency.

The Defense Technical Information Center report "Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. Vol. 1" emphasizes the need to "establish responsibility" and to "direct all means toward unity of effort" among participating agencies. It discusses establishing appropriate decision-making structures at headquarters and field levels to resolve political, humanitarian, and military issues and to coordinate operations, suggesting that coordination mechanisms are built ad hoc and mission-specific rather than managed by a single permanent agency with overarching authority.

The complexity of this system defies description," retired Lieutenant General John Vines, who last year reviewed the methods used to track the Defense Department's top-secret programs, told "The Washington Post." "Because it lacks a synchronizing process, it inevitably results in message dissonance, reduced effectiveness and waste," Vines said. "We consequently can't effectively assess whether it is making us more safe." The Post said Vines "was not aware of any agency with the authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all the interagency and commercial activities involved."

Underscoring the seriousness of these issues are the conclusions of retired Army Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, who was asked last year to review the method for tracking the Defense Department’s most sensitive programs. Vines, who once commanded 145,000 troops in Iraq and is familiar with complex problems, was stunned by what he discovered. “I’m not aware of any agency with the authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all these interagency and commercial activities,” he said in an interview. “The complexity of this system defies description.” The result, he added, is that it’s impossible to tell whether the country is safer because of all this spending and all these activities. “Because it lacks a synchronizing process, it inevitably results in message dissonance, reduced effectiveness and waste,” Vines said. “We consequently can’t effectively assess whether it is making us more safe.”

The Congressional Research Service report "Federal Interagency Coordinative Mechanisms: Varied ..." explains that federal interagency coordinative mechanisms are executive entities, possessing their own statutory or other establishing authority, that provide coordination in policy areas involving a number of separate, independent agencies. It notes a range of mechanisms from the Office of Homeland Security to the National Security Council and other entities, indicating that coordination is handled through multiple mechanisms rather than a single agency with comprehensive authority and responsibility for all interagency and commercial activities.

The report "Improving the Interagency Process to Face 21st Century Security ..." from the Center for Security Studies (ETH Zurich) lists recommendations such as revising the incentive structure to foster and reward interagency communication, moving from an ad hoc to a systematic approach, and ramping up cross-disciplinary education. These recommendations indicate awareness of weaknesses in the current interagency process and suggest that a single agency does not presently have comprehensive authority or responsibility to coordinate all such activities.

The FEMA "Joint Field Office Activation and Operations, Interagency Integrated Standard Operating Procedure" describes processes to review interagency information flow, identify operational gaps, seams, and overlaps in the consolidated national response, and identify objectives for the next coordination period. The document reflects that coordination is achieved through procedures and periodic reviews among multiple agencies rather than through a single agency that has overarching authority for all interagency and commercial activities.

A draft report from the Administrative Conference of the United States on implementation of the Government Performance and Results Modernization Act recommends clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each agency so that policies and procedures can be meshed and one can bridge agency boundaries. This language reflects recognition that agency responsibilities are fragmented and require deliberate coordination, and that there is no automatic single authority with responsibility for coordinating all interagency activities.

The Federation of American Scientists publication "Setting Interagency Coordination Efforts Up for Success" argues that to bridge the gap between policy aspiration and implementation, the federal government must push back against tribalism that currently defines interagency coordination. It recommends that the Executive Branch take steps so it can "finally coordinate policy priorities," implying that current coordination is fragmented among various bodies and not overseen by a single agency with clear authority and responsibility for all interagency and commercial activities.

According to The Washington Post’s investigation, the Pentagon brought in retired Lt. Gen. John R. Vines to study how the Defense Department tracks its most sensitive intelligence and special access programs. Vines concluded that he was “not aware of any agency with the authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all the interagency and commercial activities” associated with them.

After retirement, Vines served on the board of USFalcon, an information technology and systems engineering firm specializing in defense. He consulted for the Department of Defense, including a review of methods for tracking the department's top-secret programs, which led to comments on the lack of a synchronizing process and interagency coordination reported by The Washington Post in 2010.

Dana Priest and William Arkin report that the Pentagon asked retired Lt. Gen. John R. Vines to examine how it tracks its most sensitive programs. After the review, Vines said there was no single agency with the “authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all the interagency and commercial activities” in the top-secret world.

The Inter-American Development Bank paper "What Makes Inter-Agency Coordination Work" notes that given the difficulty of making coordination work well, managers need to use it only when it is an essential condition for achieving a specific development goal. It emphasizes the process of coordination and suggests alternative options such as reorganizing government structure or promoting competition among agencies, underscoring that coordination is complex and not typically controlled by one agency with comprehensive authority.

The GAO indicates that although the Pentagon has initiated some measures to mitigate this threat, its actions are fragmented, inconsistent, and lack comprehensive coordination. "We discovered that the department acknowledged the existence of security challenges, but they were not adequately equipped to tackle them since this was a new issue that did not align neatly with existing organizational frameworks, policies, or doctrines." Additionally, DoD officials admitted that current policies and guidance do not adequately address the spectrum of risks associated with publicly accessible digital information regarding the DoD and its personnel. They noted that part of the difficulty lies in the limited authority the department has to regulate the actions of DoD personnel and contractors outside operational settings.

The Washington Post’s exposé on “Top Secret America” recounts that retired Army Lt. Gen. John R. Vines was asked to look at how the Defense Department tracks its most sensitive programs. Vines told the paper that he was “not aware of any agency with the authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all the interagency and commercial activities,” highlighting a lack of overall coordination.

The Army Audit Agency faulted the service for failing to centrally coordinate the work, too, and for lacking mechanisms for ensuring that the recommendations from the reports were implemented. The watchdog’s investigation thus highlighted structural issues within the Army regarding oversight and coordination of its own efforts, echoing broader criticisms that there is no single authority or process to synchronize disparate activities and programs across the defense enterprise.

In its "Top Secret America" investigation, The Washington Post reported that retired Lt. Gen. John R. Vines was asked to review how the Defense Department tracks its most sensitive programs. The article quotes him saying, "I'm not aware of any agency with the authority, responsibility or a process in place to coordinate all these interagency and commercial activities," highlighting a lack of centralized oversight.

The article "Challenges of Coordination between Federal Agencies" on the Invasive Plants Western USA site states that "there is no single Agency that ensures coordination and communication between these separate Agencies." It notes that this becomes apparent in inconsistencies between policies and practices of various agencies, directly reflecting the idea that no single agency has authority, responsibility, or a process to coordinate across agencies in this specific policy area.

By regulation, the director of DLA Public Affairs must review all information considered for public release as required by DoDD 5230.09 Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release and DODI 5205.02E: DoD Operations Security Program. Beginning in 2017, DLA Public Affairs and DLA Intelligence will enter the trackable portions of the public release and OPSEC programs into the new GRC-RM tool developed by DLA Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) and DLA Finance (J8). “Using the GRC-RM tool lets us track the submitted DLA Forms 1923 and compare them with evidentiary materials such as senior leader calendars, news stories, and conference agendas,” Baker said. This illustrates that tracking processes exist at component level, rather than as a single, department-wide mechanism covering all sensitive programs and interagency and commercial activities.

DoD Instruction 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the review of DoD information intended for public release. It requires that any official DoD information pertaining to military matters, national security issues, or subjects of significant concern undergo a prepublication review before release. While this instruction sets a process for controlling public disclosure of sensitive information, it does not create an agency with comprehensive authority and responsibility to coordinate all interagency and commercial activities related to the Department’s most sensitive programs.

The Department of the Navy Intelligence Oversight Commanders Handbook describes internal procedures and points of contact for intelligence oversight within the Navy. It directs commanders to contact specific offices for training briefs, templates, and courses, and provides contact information for the DUSN Intelligence Directorate. The handbook illustrates that oversight and coordination mechanisms are organized by service and function, rather than under a single agency with overarching authority and responsibility for all interagency and commercial activities connected with the Defense Department’s most sensitive programs.

The Department of Defense announced heightened scrutiny of its 8(a) and other small business contracting programs, including a review to ensure contracting dollars are spent on legitimate small businesses and not “illegal pass-through schemes.” The memorandum specifies that, by Feb. 28, 2026, DoD must confirm that contractors are complying with the limitations on subcontracting and that any evidence of improper subcontracting should be sent to the DoD and SBA Offices of Inspector General and potentially referred to the Department of Justice. This shows targeted oversight processes for specific contracting issues, rather than a unified process to coordinate all interagency and commercial activities related to sensitive defense programs.

This 2023 Department of Defense report, "Immediate Review and Assessment of DoD Information Security Procedures," describes current policies and procedures for handling and protecting non-public DoD information, including rules on electronic messaging, classified information systems, and coordination with cleared defense contractors. It illustrates ongoing efforts to systematize information security and control over sensitive programs, contrasting with earlier assessments that criticized the lack of a comprehensive coordinating authority across interagency and commercial activities.

Testimony and documents before congressional armed services committees on issues such as military space operations and controlled unclassified information (CUI) show concerns about data exfiltration from cleared defense contractors and the need for improved oversight and integration with other intelligence agencies. These materials provide context for broader debates on whether any single agency effectively coordinates interagency and commercial activities related to sensitive defense programs.

In Army and Defense Department discussions of counterintelligence and protection of sensitive technology, officials have emphasized empowering counterintelligence forces, strengthening oversight, and integrating efforts with other intelligence agencies. These efforts respond to long-standing criticisms that oversight and coordination of sensitive programs, including those involving commercial contractors, have been fragmented.