“The European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) said that Peru’s proposed judicial reforms threaten judicial independence.”

The Venice Commission states that several projects are under examination that would introduce changes to Peru’s 1993 Constitution and directly affect the Public Ministry, the selection of supreme prosecutors, their powers, and disciplinary procedures against them. It also notes that the reform package could alter the institutional balance and, in the Commission’s view, requires a comprehensive approach rather than piecemeal changes.

In its conclusions, the Venice Commission warns that the proposed constitutional and legislative reforms would weaken key guarantees of judicial independence in Peru. It notes that the abolition of the National Board of Justice and its replacement by bodies with a stronger role for Congress "would seriously endanger the independence of judges and prosecutors" and that the planned changes risk "subjecting the judiciary to political influence". The Commission therefore recommends that the reforms, as drafted, should not be pursued and that any changes must ensure the effective independence of the justice system.

The European Commission is taking action to protect the rule of law in Europe. Judicial reforms in Poland mean that the country's judiciary is now under the control of the executive and legislative branches, rather than being independent.

The Special Rapporteur says that Mexico’s reform package could undermine the independence of the judiciary and, if enacted without substantial modifications, would pose a serious threat to judicial independence. This is not about Peru, but it is a high-authority primary source showing how UN experts assess judicial-reform packages that concentrate political control over judges.

The Venice Commission has repeatedly criticised constitutional reforms that enable political authorities to influence the composition or functioning of judicial councils or similar bodies. Its opinions have underlined that early termination of mandates of members of such bodies, or restructuring that leads to their political capture, is contrary to the principle of judicial independence. These general standards are invoked in recent opinions concerning reforms in several Council of Europe and non-member states.

The article says the Venice Commission issued its opinion on constitutional and legislative reforms related to the Judicial Branch in Peru and warned of serious structural weaknesses. It adds that the Commission concluded the initiatives had been developed "in rapid succession and in an uncoordinated manner," and that partial reforms could deepen institutional instability and affect judicial independence.

The rule of law and judicial independence are expressed in the law of the European Union as fundamental values. The report explains how legal and political pressure can undermine judicial independence and how strategic litigation is used to defend it.

Peru’s congress has been mulling changes that would amount to a far-reaching overhaul of Peru’s justice system. Though specific provisions have yet to be announced, the same parties seek to oust the country’s National Justice Board, which administers the judiciary. Lawmakers could propose the reform in early March and if it passes, it too could clip the judiciary’s wings. The Venice Commission has been asked to provide an opinion on the reform’s compatibility with international standards on judicial independence.

On March 7, 2024, Congress removed two of the board's seven members, citing a disagreement between lawmakers and the board over the interpretation of the law regarding the required age to be a member of the board. The board appoints and removes judges and prosecutors, as well as the heads of the agencies that organize elections and maintain the electoral registry. The removal of its members opens the door to political influence in the justice and electoral systems, endangering the right to vote. Human Rights Watch has urged international bodies, including the Organization of American States and the Venice Commission, to scrutinize attacks on judicial independence in Peru.

The standards are intended to support European judges whose work preserves liberal democracy and the rule of law. They set out principles for safeguarding judicial independence against external influence.

The paper cites the Venice Commission’s report on the independence of the judicial system, noting that it identifies several threats, including political influence over appointments and budgetary controls. It quotes the Commission as stating that "the financing of the courts must not be based on discretionary decisions of the political branches" because such arrangements can endanger judicial independence. Although the document is not about Peru’s reform specifically, it provides the Venice Commission’s baseline standards for assessing whether reforms threaten judicial independence.

The report says the Venice Commission examined reforms to the judicial system in Peru and stressed the need to guarantee transparent, merit-based processes free from external interference in the appointment and permanence of judges. It also says the Commission recommended addressing the high proportion of temporary judges through comprehensive and coordinated reforms.

The Venice Commission’s growing docket shows how its standards on judicial councils and similar bodies are now used well beyond the Council of Europe region. Recent opinions have addressed reforms in countries such as Spain, Serbia and, more recently, Peru’s constitutional reforms. In the Peruvian case, the Commission was asked to scrutinise proposals affecting the National Board of Justice, highlighting concerns that political reshuffling of its membership could jeopardise judicial independence.

The Venice Commission’s opinions, while advisory, carry considerable weight in assessing whether judicial reforms comply with European and international standards. In its work on Poland and other countries, the Commission has warned that restructuring judicial councils or prematurely terminating the mandates of their members can seriously threaten judicial independence. These concerns have also informed more recent requests for opinions on proposed reforms in countries such as Peru.

This summary of the Venice Commission’s 146th plenary session says the Commission addressed Peru and described a global reform that would eliminate the temporary ratification of judges, rethink constitutional accusation mechanisms, and other changes. The piece reflects the Commission’s concern with institutional design and judicial independence in the Peruvian reforms.

Across Latin America, reform efforts that alter the composition or tenure of judicial councils or similar bodies, often under the guise of ‘renewal’ or ‘modernisation’, have been criticised by international bodies such as the Venice Commission and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In Peru, proposals to reconfigure institutions responsible for judicial appointments and discipline have raised questions about their impact on judicial independence, even before detailed texts have been finalised.

The article analyses how the Venice Commission evaluates judicial reforms, focusing on standards regarding the independence of judicial councils and the inadmissibility of political interference in judges’ mandates. It notes that the Commission has voiced similar concerns in opinions on reforms in non‑European states, including Latin American countries, where premature termination of mandates or politicised appointments have been deemed incompatible with judicial independence.

The article offers an academic discussion of the Venice Commission’s doctrine on judicial independence in the context of preserving the rule of law. It is relevant background, but it does not itself state that Peru’s reforms threatened judicial independence.

These judicial reforms clearly illustrate that the independence of self-governing institutions of justice must be strengthened and strictly observed. The piece argues that judicial independence is a pillar of the rule of law.

Peru’s judiciary has been subject to repeated waves of reform, often prompted by corruption scandals or political crises. International advisory bodies, including the Venice Commission, have increasingly been called upon to assess whether such reforms comply with standards on judicial independence and the protection of fundamental rights. The study explains that reforms which alter the composition or tenure of judicial authorities for political reasons are typically viewed as threatening the autonomy of the judiciary.

The article analyses how the Venice Commission’s standards on judicial independence are applied across different countries. It notes that the Commission’s "Rule of Law Checklist" and its opinions on judicial reforms emphasize that any restructuring of judicial councils or appointment procedures must avoid exposing judges to political pressure. The author observes that in various opinions, including those on Latin American states, the Commission has indicated that reforms which abolish or weaken independent judicial councils can be considered a threat to judicial independence.

In late 2024 the Venice Commission adopted an opinion on a Peruvian draft constitutional reform that would prematurely terminate the mandates of the members of the National Board of Justice and allow their replacement under new rules. In that opinion the Commission stated that such measures were incompatible with international standards and would undermine judicial independence, effectively warning that the proposed reform posed a threat to the independence of the judiciary.