The bill would amend the Judicial Career Law to make it a very serious offense for judges to grant freedom to people accused of serious crimes. The text says judges who improperly order the release of detainees could be sanctioned, which is distinct from giving the President power to remove judges deemed traitors to the homeland.

A congressional bill seeks to modify article 48 of Law 29277, the Judicial Career Law, so that judges who free suspected sicarios, extortionists, and other serious offenders can be dismissed. The proposal is framed as a disciplinary reform, not a presidential removal power.

The draft law says it would create a new legal framework to punish and even permanently disqualify judges or prosecutors who improperly release detainees or act contrary to the law. The proposed changes target judicial discipline and criminal liability, not a president’s unilateral power to remove judges for treason.

The Peruvian Congress is discussing a set of constitutional amendments that would profoundly reshape the justice system, including changing how Supreme Court judges are appointed and weakening the National Board of Justice (JNJ), the body that selects, evaluates, and can remove judges and prosecutors. However, none of the publicly available proposals grant the president direct power to remove judges or label them "traitors to the homeland" as a legal category for dismissal. The reforms instead focus on transferring powers away from the JNJ to Congress and a future Senate, expanding impeachment mechanisms, and altering appointment and ratification procedures.

The TUO of the Organic Law of the Judicial Power explains the procedure for the **separation or dismissal of judges**: "In application of Article 154 section 3) of the Political Constitution, [the Supreme Court] shall request from the National Board of Justice, in the name and representation of the Supreme Court within a period not exceeding 15 calendar days, the application of the measures of separation or dismissal proposed by the Office of Control of the Magistracy of the Judicial Power." It adds: "In the case of Supreme Judges, they must be referred to the National Board of Justice, as established in section 3 of article 154 of the Political Constitution of Peru, as well as in the cases of judges at any level whose sanction merits dismissal or in cases assumed ex officio by the National Board of Justice." This framework attributes dismissal power to the National Board of Justice, not to the President of the Republic.

In a detailed study of Peruvian judicial reform, the author recalls that the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of November 6, 1996 stated that "only the National Council of the Magistracy has the exclusive competence for the dismissal of judges" and that only the separation of judges who do not meet the required conditions could be a competence of the Executive Commission. The article emphasizes that subsequent laws (such as Law 26623 and Law 26933) modified disciplinary powers but did **not grant dismissal powers to the President of the Republic**; instead they redistributed them between the National Council of the Magistracy and executive commissions of the Judicial Power and Public Ministry.

Recent legislative initiatives in Peru have sought to weaken or dismantle the Junta Nacional de Justicia (JNJ) and modify judicial oversight, raising serious concerns about judicial independence. Among the bills analyzed are: Bill No. 08657/2024-CR, which proposes automatic dismissal of judges and prosecutors whose sentences are revoked; Bill No. 8678/2024-CR, creating a congressional commission to oversee judges and prosecutors; and Bill No. 8694/2024-CR, changing the presidency of the Judiciary and ending judges’ terms automatically. None of these bills provide the President of the Republic with authority to remove judges by declaring them "traitors to the homeland"; rather, they expand congressional and institutional control over judicial careers. In October 2024, the President submitted Bill No. 09297/2024-PE to modify Law No. 30942 and preside over the Council for the Reform of the Justice System, but this bill concerns leadership and coordination roles, not direct presidential dismissal powers over judges.

An academic article on the reform of the Judicial Power in Peru explains that the **National Council of the Magistracy** was created "to select judges" and that its mission included "selecting and appointing all magistrates at all levels, as well as investigating them and imposing disciplinary measures, including dismissal." It further notes that the Council proposed appointments to the Executive Power, which carried out the formal appointment, but disciplinary and dismissal powers remained within the judicial and council framework rather than the President personally.

On March 7, 2024, Peru’s Congress arbitrarily removed two members of the National Board of Justice (JNJ), citing disagreements over the interpretation of age requirements for membership. Human Rights Watch stated that this decision "severely undermines judicial independence, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights" in Peru. The organization highlighted that Congress—not the president—is driving recent attacks on judicial independence, including efforts to oust JNJ members and change how Peru’s justice system is administered. The article does not mention any proposal that would empower the President of Peru to remove judges as "traitors to the homeland"; instead, it focuses on congressional overreach and institutional weakening of the JNJ.

On the official page of the Judicial Power, the organization of the **Executive Council of the Judicial Power** is described: "The Executive Council is composed of: the President of the Judicial Power, who presides it and has a simple vote and a casting vote; two Supreme Judges elected..." The description of functions focuses on administrative and organizational powers within the Judicial Power and does **not mention any authority of the President of the Republic to remove judges or to classify them as 'traitors to the homeland.'"

Peru’s Congress has been considering judicial reforms that could amount to a far‑reaching overhaul of the country’s justice system. The proposed changes are aimed at the National Justice Board (JNJ), which administers the judiciary, and may include altering its structure and powers or even replacing it. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that these initiatives form part of broader democratic erosion in Peru but emphasizes that the reforms are being driven by Congress and political parties, not by the president. The description of the debate and prospective reforms does not include any provision granting the President of Peru the power to reorganize the judiciary by removing judges labeled "traitors to the homeland".

In 2019 and 2020, Peru amended its Constitution and adopted an organic law creating the Junta Nacional de Justicia (JNJ), a new independent body responsible for vetting new and sitting judges and prosecutors. The JNJ conducts merit-based contests to select judges, periodically vets and ratifies their positions, and has constitutional authority to sanction and remove judges of the Supreme Court and lower courts. The report underscores that it is the JNJ—not the president—that has the power to remove judges, and that these processes must be justified and public. No mention is made of any legal mechanism allowing the President of Peru to dismiss judges deemed "traitors to the homeland"; instead, reforms have aimed to professionalize and insulate judicial discipline from direct political control.

A bill promoted by Congressman Roberto Chiabra sought to amend constitutional and judicial-career provisions so Congress would have the power to remove supreme court judges and prosecutors, reducing the role of the National Board of Justice. This is a legislative removal proposal, not a presidential power.

A document of the Peruvian Congress notes that, "By various decree-laws the Executive Power decreed the **reorganization of the Judicial Power and the Public Ministry in 1992**, justifying it with the need to modernize and make justice more efficient." It describes the creation of specialized chambers and administrative changes, but it does **not mention any provision granting the President of the Republic the power to remove judges as 'traitors to the homeland.'" The reorganization is framed in terms of efficiency and institutional restructuring rather than disciplinary powers of the President.

In July 2018, President Martín Vizcarra announced a set of constitutional amendment proposals to reform Peru’s judicial and political systems following a judicial corruption scandal. The reforms included changes to the composition and selection of members of the National Magistrature Council, regulation of party financing, a ban on immediate reelection of members of Congress, and the creation of a two‑chamber Congress. The article explains that these reforms required congressional approval and a referendum and did not propose granting the president unilateral power to remove judges or characterizing judges as "traitors to the homeland" for purposes of dismissal. The focus was on institutional restructuring and anti‑corruption measures rather than expanding presidential control over individual judges.

An article in the official journal of the Judicial Power argues that "the democratic judicial restructuring of the 21st century does not comprise nor is it exhausted in the period of a specific President of the Republic or a President of the Judicial Power" and stresses that "in a context of constitutional democracy the jurisdictional power of judges cannot be arbitrary, because its foundation is judicial independence." The text defends the **independence of judges from political power** and does not contemplate any role for the President of the Republic in dismissing judges as "traitors to the homeland."

The initiative proposed a constitutional reform in the Judicial Branch and the Public Ministry by modifying articles 144 and 158 of the Peruvian Constitution, and it would change the judicial and fiscal career laws to give Congress the power to dismiss supreme judges and prosecutors.

Following the irregular re‑election of President Alberto Fujimori and the ensuing crisis, Peru adopted reforms "to insure the constitutional independence of the judicial branch" (Law 27465). In October 2000, Congress approved provisions restoring judicial independence from the executive, including Laws 27368 and 27362, which re‑established constitutional systems for appointment, promotion, and training of judges and restored proper functions to the National Council of the Judiciary. These reforms abolished mechanisms allowing widespread use of provisional and alternate judges. The International Commission of Jurists report emphasizes that the intent was to remove executive influence over judicial careers; it does not describe any later proposal authorizing the president to remove judges as "traitors to the homeland."

The text discusses an "argument 2" about a proposal for the dismissal of judges and separation of powers. It states that allowing the dismissal of judges branded as "traitors to the homeland" would open the door to political persecution and undermine confidence in the judicial system. It argues that judicial independence and the separation of powers are essential to prevent the executive from punishing judges for their decisions.

The comparative page on removal of judges from the Library of the National Congress of Chile compiles constitutional rules from multiple countries. It shows various models where removal may involve parliaments, specialized councils, or judicial bodies. In some constitutions cited, a **President** may formally remove a Supreme Court judge but only after a legislative supermajority and for reasons such as "misconduct or incapacity." It does **not list Peru as a case where the President can unilaterally remove judges**, and none of the examples refer to judges being classified as "traitors to the homeland" for removal.

The Inter‑American Commission on Human Rights reported that approximately 80% of Peruvian judges were provisional and did not enjoy guarantees of stability, meaning they could be removed without cause. This situation, combined with other factors, made the judiciary vulnerable to political interference. The report critiques these vulnerabilities and calls for reforms to ensure judicial independence. While it documents past executive and political pressure on judges, it does not mention any legal framework explicitly permitting the President of Peru to remove judges branded "traitors to the homeland." The issues discussed concern instability, provisional appointments, and lack of tenure protections rather than a formal traitor‑based removal mechanism.

The bill seeks to establish as a very serious offense that judges grant liberty to people involved in serious crimes. It is about dismissing judges through legislative discipline mechanisms, not the President removing judges for treason.

The post refers to the presentation of a report by the spokesperson and president of the Justice and Human Rights Commission of the Peru Libre parliamentary caucus. It indicates that he "presented the report that proposes" reforms related to justice, but the short preview does not specify the content of the proposal. It is a primary source from a political actor advocating judicial changes.

The Facebook feed of the Junta Nacional de Justicia (JNJ) includes Communiqué 001-2025-JNJ. In that communiqué, the JNJ expresses concern over legislative proposals that seek to modify the constitutional framework governing the appointment and removal of judges and prosecutors. It warns that transferring these powers away from the JNJ to other political bodies would seriously affect judicial independence and the rule of law in Peru.

A legislative proposal would punish judges who release suspects in serious-crime cases and could lead to dismissal. The reporting does not support the claim that the President of Peru would be empowered to remove judges deemed traitors to the homeland.

The video explains a controversial proposal by congressman Jorge Chiabra under which Congress, not the Junta Nacional de Justicia, would have the power to dismiss supreme court judges and supreme prosecutors. It says the proposal would modify articles 144 and 158 of the Constitution, limiting the JNJ to executing dismissal decisions made by Congress. The video describes this as a project that would give Congress an active role in removing members of the Supreme Court and the Fiscalía de la Nación, raising concerns about judicial independence.

Scholarly analysis of Peruvian judicial reform has noted episodes where political authorities interfered with the judiciary, including an instance of arbitrary removal of three Constitutional Court judges after they declared a presidential re‑election law inapplicable. These episodes are cited as violations of judicial independence and the rule of law. Nonetheless, the broader review of reforms focuses on institutional arrangements such as merit‑based selection bodies and limitations on executive influence. There is no reference to a constitutional or legislative proposal that would reorganize the judiciary by empowering the president to remove judges deemed "traitors to the homeland"; instead, research highlights concerns about impeachment and provisional appointments.

Supreme judge Elvia Barrios analyzes a congressional commission's constitutional reform plan that would no longer consider the Judicial Branch as an independent power of the state, but rather as part of a broader "justice system". She warns that the plan would subordinate the Judicial Branch by equating it with the Public Ministry, National Police and control authorities, thereby breaking the balance of powers. She also notes that the reform projects include several substantial changes and multiple drafts, but does not mention any mechanism for the President to directly remove judges as "traitors to the homeland".

This discussion of justice reform proposals in Peru compares the ideas of Roberto Sánchez and Keiko Fujimori. Among the initiatives described are a "disruptive" reform by Sánchez that would create a system of transitional and plurinational justice and allow the election of supreme judges by popular vote. On the other side, Keiko Fujimori's plan proposes an integral reform of the justice system emphasizing collaboration among judicial institutions, but neither proposal includes giving the President authority to dismiss judges as "traitors to the homeland".

The article discusses how political actors in Peru have repeatedly tried to control the Judicial Branch and related institutions. It mentions past episodes such as Alberto Fujimori's 1992 "self-coup" dissolving Congress and intervening in the judiciary, as well as recent initiatives by parties like Fuerza Popular and Perú Libre to change institutional rules, attack electoral bodies, and approve bicameralism. It frames these moves as part of a broader plan to capture key state powers and weaken judicial independence, but does not describe any current proposal specifically empowering the President to remove judges for "treason to the homeland".

This report recounts a crisis in Peru's justice system in 2018, when the president of Peru, Martín Vizcarra, convened an extraordinary congressional session to discuss expelling members of the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (CNM), following corruption scandals. The CNM was the body responsible for appointing and dismissing judges and prosecutors. The piece shows the executive appealing to Congress to remove magistrate council members, but it does not suggest that the President could directly dismiss judges himself or label them as "traitors to the homeland".

This PDF compiles proposals for reforming Peru's justice administration system, focusing on the Consejo Nacional de la Magistratura (CNM). It suggests despoliticizing the appointment of CNM members, improving procedures for selection, appointment, ratification and dismissal of judges and prosecutors, and strengthening external disciplinary control. The document notes that currently the CNM is only authorized to dismiss magistrates and calls for a renewed CNM to guarantee judicial discipline, but it does not propose giving the President power to remove judges as "traitors to the homeland".

This post refers to recommendations from the now-defunct MACCIH (Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras) to reform article 319 of the Honduran Constitution to establish guarantees for judges and magistrates, emphasizing judicial independence and protection from political pressure. While it concerns Honduras rather than Peru, it illustrates broader regional debates on safeguarding judges from arbitrary removal by political authorities, including presidents.