The authors state: "We show information technology (in short IT) caused rising monopoly power and rising income and wealth inequality since the 1970's." They argue that the diffusion of IT has strengthened leading firms and allowed them to earn and retain higher markups, contributing to increased concentration and monopoly power in many sectors of the economy.

This IMF working paper reports that "markups have increased by close to 8 percent since 2000" at the global firm level and that "concentration has also increased in advanced economies, particularly in the technology sector." It concludes that "these findings are consistent with a rise in market power" and notes that technological change, globalization, and intangible capital are among the drivers.

This article explains that "The Chicago School is known for asserting that economic efficiency is and should be the only purpose of antitrust law." It describes how Chicago scholars such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner reconceptualized antitrust "to focus narrowly on consumer welfare and economic efficiency, rejecting broader concerns about market structure, political power, and the protection of small businesses." The piece contrasts this with earlier antitrust traditions that were more concerned with concentrated economic power and its political implications.

This Fed staff paper finds that "average markups in the U.S. economy have risen significantly since the early 1980s" and reports that the increase is "driven by firms at the top of the markup distribution" that have gained market shares. It concludes that the data are "consistent with an increase in market power" and explores how this rise in dominant firms affects investment, wages, and the labor share.

This NBER working paper finds that "concentration is increasing in the majority of U.S. industries" when measured using national sales data. The authors report that the top firms have increased their market share in many sectors and state that these patterns are "consistent with an increase in the dominance of large firms" though they caution that higher concentration is not itself proof of weaker competition.

Bougette and co-authors distinguish between a "First" Chicago School (1930s) and a "Second" Chicago School (post‑1950s). They note that the First Chicago School, including Henry Simons, "supported an interventionist antitrust policy to avoid excessive market concentration" and even advocated deconcentration in U.S. industry, showing that some early Chicagoans feared the dangers of monopoly. By contrast, the Second Chicago School "consisted of grounding antitrust decisions in economic efficiency" and "framed efficiency as the exclusive goal of antitrust." The paper emphasizes that this later Chicago School provided a "market-centered approach" to antitrust and criticized broad per se rules, thereby narrowing the range of practices treated as threats to competition or sources of durable monopoly power.

The authors write: "we provide evidence and theory to support a core claim of the monopoly capital perspective, that 'as the internationalisation of monopoly capital grows, control over world production, trade, and finance is increasingly exercised by a relatively small number of global corporations'." They argue that contemporary capitalism is best described as "monopoly capitalism" characterised by "high and persistent concentration" and "oligopolistic control" over key global markets.

Sawyer argues that "the development of monopoly capitalism is closely associated with the growing dominance of large corporations and the increasing concentration of capital" over the last 40 years. The paper notes that "there are, no doubt, many factors at play," but claims that empirical work on profit-led growth and financialisation "finds empirical support" for monopoly-capitalism analysis and documents increases in corporate concentration and profit shares in advanced economies.

Mark Glick’s working paper summarizes the Chicago School position as one in which markets are assumed to be largely self-regulating and monopoly power rare. He explains that Chicago scholars argued that most business practices previously seen as anticompetitive—such as vertical restraints and many mergers—are either neutral or efficiency enhancing and therefore unlikely to lead to durable monopoly. The paper argues that this approach led to a significant reduction in antitrust enforcement, based on the Chicago claim that "big business seeks efficiencies" and that earlier, more interventionist antitrust policy was largely misguided.

The paper distinguishes Schumpeter’s original 'big-is-better' account from a later 'small-is-better' account. It says that in the original account, large monopoly firms are the most able and most likely to produce new, leapfrogging innovations.

This commentary defines the "monopoly capitalism thesis" as the Marxist idea that "left to its own devices capitalism tends toward monopoly." It contrasts that thesis with the Chicago School, noting that Chicago economists generally rejected the view that capitalism naturally produces monopoly and instead saw competition as robust and self-correcting absent state-created barriers. The author discusses how Chicago-style industrial organization economics helped displace the earlier monopoly-capitalism narrative in mid‑20th‑century U.S. economics departments.

The article argues that monopoly power is rising within contemporary capitalism and that concentration is a structural feature of the system. It presents monopoly as an increasingly important characteristic of capitalism rather than a marginal anomaly.

In standard microeconomics, capitalism does not automatically imply monopoly. Competitive markets can produce temporary market power through economies of scale, network effects, and barriers to entry, but antitrust policy, contestability, and innovation can also prevent durable monopoly. Some schools of thought, especially Marxian political economy and certain heterodox traditions, argue that capitalism tends toward concentration and monopoly over time.

The page says Schumpeter concluded that capitalism would be 'killed by its achievements' and that creative destruction wipes away obsolete technologies, ideas, and institutions. This is relevant because it frames capitalist development as generating forces that can reshape or concentrate market power.

The lecture relates Marxist theories of monopoly capitalism to Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction and says both Marx and Schumpeter agree that capitalism evolves through major structural change. It is useful contextual evidence for the broader idea that capitalism can produce monopoly-like structures.

The page argues that economists largely agree harmful monopolies cannot emerge in a genuinely free market. It presents the opposite of the claim under investigation, saying monopoly is not a natural result of free-market capitalism.

The article reports Glen Weyl’s argument that private property itself creates monopoly-like control and that capitalism is inherently monopolistic. This is an explicit pro-claim viewpoint, though it is an interview/opinion piece rather than primary evidence.

The video says Joseph Schumpeter first popularized the term 'creative destruction' in 1942 and describes it as industrial change in which the economic structure is radically transformed from within. This is lower-authority background context only.