Mao writes that because China is a "semi-colonial and semi-feudal" country, its revolution must pass through a democratic stage before socialism, and that "the agrarian revolution is the main content of the Chinese democratic revolution." He states that "the peasants are the main force in the democratic revolution" and that New Democracy is "a republic founded on the alliance of the workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, led by the proletariat." Mao contrasts this path with "the old type of European-American capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship," arguing that China must follow a different road adapted to its conditions.

Mao explains that because China is "semi-colonial and semi-feudal in character, the process of China’s revolution must be divided into two steps. The first step is to change the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal form of society into an independent democratic society, while the second step is to push the revolution forward to establish a socialist society." He writes that this first stage "is certainly not to, and certainly cannot, establish a capitalist society dictated by the bourgeoisie, but to establish a New Democracy ruled by the alliance of several revolutionary classes." Mao identifies "the proletariat, the peasants, the intelligentsia and other petit-bourgeois elements of China" as "the basic forces that determine the destiny of the country" and says these will "inevitably become the most basic part in the constitution of the power and the nation" in the Democratic Republic of China.

Following the defeat of the urban communist movement in the late 1920s, Mao shifted the party’s focus from the cities to the countryside. The CCP then built rural base areas, including soviets in Jiangxi and elsewhere, around peasant support.

Mao Zedong adapted Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions by arguing that the peasantry, not the industrial proletariat, was the main revolutionary force in China. The CCP accordingly pursued a rural, peasant-based revolutionary strategy.

In this famous report Mao concluded that "the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event" and that "to overthrow the feudal forces... the peasants must unite and rise in revolution." He explicitly praised the revolutionary role of the poor peasants and criticized those who "despise the peasants" from an urban perspective, using his investigation of rural Hunan to justify a peasant‑based revolutionary strategy.

Britannica explains that Maoism "is a form of Marxism‑Leninism developed by Mao Zedong" and that it "differs from classical Marxism in its greater emphasis on the peasantry as a revolutionary force." It notes that in Mao’s adaptation, "the rural peasantry rather than the urban proletariat was seen as the main force of the revolution" in the Chinese context.

After the failure of the urban insurrections, the CCP shifted its revolutionary base to the countryside. Under Mao Zedong, the party developed the strategy of mobilizing peasants and creating rural revolutionary base areas rather than relying on the urban proletariat alone.

Mao Zedong’s most important contribution was adapting Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions by emphasizing the revolutionary role of the peasantry. This differed from the orthodox Marxist focus on the industrial working class and the cities.

Mao concluded that China’s revolution would have to be based on the peasantry and the countryside. He developed a rural guerrilla strategy and rural soviets as the foundation for Communist power after the CCP’s setbacks in the cities.

A leading synthesis on Mao notes that he "adapted Marxism‑Leninism to the overwhelmingly rural conditions of China by elevating the revolutionary role of the peasantry" and by "shifting the strategic focus of armed struggle to the countryside and the establishment of rural base areas." The article contrasts this with the classical Marxist expectation of an urban, industrial proletarian revolution.

This scholarly article states that "Mao Tse‑tung’s thought came into being apparently through contact with and dependence on Marxism‑Leninism" but that its originality lay in "its application to the concrete conditions of a predominantly peasant country." It emphasizes that Mao "placed the peasantry, rather than the urban proletariat, at the center of the revolutionary strategy" and developed the practice of "encircling the cities from the countryside" as the path to seize power.

Traditional Marxist thinking relegated peasants to a class which Marx believed represented "barbarism within civilization" — people who were unable to develop revolutionary consciousness and only wanted land and bread. During the Russian Revolution, Lenin revised Marx's view, assigning peasants a more supporting revolutionary role, although he still believed that it was the urban working class which initiated revolution. In the 1920s, Chinese leftists began to change their view of the revolutionary potential of the rural population… Likewise, Mao Zedong's own work in the rural areas in 1925 and 1926 led him to see the farmers differently… When Nationalist forces after 1927 drove him and other Communists to rural hideouts from their urban bases, they intensified their work among the rural population. Their belief in rural revolution thus became a hallmark of Chinese Communist thinking.

The article argues that "Maoism represents a radical re‑interpretation of Marxism‑Leninism in which the peasantry is transformed from a supporting force into the principal revolutionary class." It describes how Mao’s strategy "relied on building rural revolutionary base areas and a peasant Red Army" instead of attempting to spark an immediate insurrection in the urban industrial centers.

Mao describes "a great revolution in the countryside, a revolution without parallel in history" in which peasants "smashed the political prestige and power of the landlord class" and established "peasant authority in rural society." He writes that "this great mass of poor peasants… are the backbone of the peasant associations, the vanguard in the overthrow of the feudal forces," and that "without the poor peasant class… it would have been impossible to bring about the present revolutionary situation in the countryside." He defines this explicitly as "a rural revolution… by which the peasantry overthrows the power of the feudal landlord class" and insists that "the rural areas need a mighty revolutionary upsurge, for it alone can rouse the people in their millions to become a powerful force."

The article argues that "this strategy of relying on the poor peasants and agricultural workers while allying with the middle peasants was basic to the Communist-led rural revolution." It examines how Mao's policies in the mid-1920s departed from orthodox Marxist emphasis on an urban proletariat by making the rural poor the principal revolutionary force. The study shows that Mao's approach was grounded in the social reality of a predominantly peasant China and built a revolutionary base in the countryside rather than in the cities.

The piece states that "Mao Zedong transformed the peasantry, a class disdained by Marx, into the 'main force' of his anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution." It explains that whereas classical Marxism saw the urban proletariat as the leading revolutionary class, Mao's innovation was to treat the Chinese peasantry as the central actor in a protracted rural-based struggle. According to the article, this reorientation of Marxism–Leninism toward the village was a defining feature of Maoism.

The essay explains that Mao "reinterpreted Marxism–Leninism for a predominantly agrarian country" by arguing that in China "the peasantry was the principal revolutionary force" and that revolution had to be built "from the countryside to the cities." It describes how in the 1930s Mao developed the strategy of "protracted people’s war" in which "rural base areas" and a "peasant army" encircle and eventually seize the urban centers, rather than relying on an insurrection of an already-developed industrial working class as in classical Marxist models.

After the KMT turned on the CCP in 1927, the communists were largely eliminated in the urban areas. This helped push the party toward rural base areas and the Chinese Soviet Republic as the center of revolutionary activity.

This historical analysis argues that Mao’s major theoretical contribution was "the elevation of the peasantry from a subordinate to a central role in the revolutionary process" in contrast to orthodox Marxism’s focus on the urban proletariat. It details how Mao’s strategy of "building rural base areas" and waging a "peasant-based guerrilla war" to surround and capture the cities represented an adaptation of Marxism–Leninism to "China’s overwhelmingly rural social structure."

The overview notes that "in 1927 and 1930, Mao produced studies on rural conditions in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces that were key to the development of his theories on peasant revolution." It explains that Mao "believed that China's revolution had to be based in the countryside" and that he developed the idea of "surrounding the cities from the countryside" because "China was a predominantly peasant society with only a small urban working class."

The paper notes that "Mao, seeing the number of peasants within the country, decided to make the peasantry the biggest force in his revolution." It emphasizes that Mao's adaptation of Marxism–Leninism was shaped by China's demographic reality as a largely agrarian society and by his conviction that peasants could be mobilized as the leading revolutionary class. The analysis links Mao's strategy of mass mobilization and collectivization to this peasant-centered revolutionary theory.

The article observes that "Mao became the great leader of the Chinese people exactly because he was able to see the revolutionary potential of peasant leaders." It states that "it was these peasants and not the urban working class that Mao mobilized as the main force of the Chinese revolution," highlighting his divergence from the classical Marxist focus on an industrial proletariat.

The teaching resource explains that "Mao believed that China’s revolution had to be rooted in the rural peasantry, who made up the majority of the population but had been historically marginalized." It connects this belief to policies such as the "Down to the Countryside Movement," in which "millions of urban youth were sent to rural areas" to learn from peasants. The text underscores that a major goal was to close the "urban-rural divide" and elevate the revolutionary role of the countryside in line with Mao's broader ideological emphasis on rural forces.

The article describes **New Democracy** as Mao Zedong’s theory that in semi-colonial, semi-feudal countries like China, democracy "would take a path that was decisively distinct from that in any other country." It notes that the Chinese application of this concept "resulted in the CCP's appeal to a coalition of the urban and rural poor, progressive intellectuals, and bourgeois 'patriotic democrats,' ultimately contributing to a successful revolution." The bloc of classes is symbolized by the PRC flag, where the large star represents the Communist Party and the four small stars the workers, peasants, intelligentsia, and national capitalists.

This scholarly discussion explains that for Mao, "the foundation of the people’s democratic dictatorship is…the alliance of the working class, peasantry and urban petty-bourgeoisie. It is essentially the alliance of the workers and peasants, because these two classes comprise eighty to ninety per cent of China’s population." It notes that "in overthrowing imperialism and the reactionary clique of the Kuomintang, these two classes are the major force" and that the transition from New Democracy to socialism "depends primarily upon the alliance of these two classes," highlighting the centrality of peasants in Mao’s strategy.

The article states that during the New Democratic Revolution, "Mao Zedong scientifically explored the problem of farmers and inherited and innovated Marxist peasant theory." It argues that Mao "placed the peasantry in the position of main force of the revolution" and developed the theory of "encircling the cities from the countryside" through building rural base areas and engaging in protracted people's war. The author emphasizes that this line differed from classical Marxist–Leninist stress on an urban proletarian uprising.

This commentary notes that Mao "posited that the Chinese revolution would unfold in two distinct, yet closely connected, stages: first, the democratic revolution, termed New Democracy, and second, the socialist revolution." It explains that the Common Program defined China as a "new democratic country" practicing a "people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and based on an alliance of workers and peasants" and that this framework institutionalized Mao’s concept of a worker–peasant alliance at the core of state power in a predominantly agrarian society.

Mao’s revolutionary theory in China placed the peasantry at the center of the socialist revolution, reflecting a shift away from a purely urban working-class model and toward a worker-peasant alliance grounded in the countryside.

The entry defines Maoism as "a variety of Marxism–Leninism" derived from the teachings of Mao Zedong and notes that it "emphasizes the role of the peasantry, small-scale industry, and agricultural collectivization in its construction of socialism." It explains that a distinctive element is the "strategy of protracted people's war," in which revolution "begins in the countryside, encircles the cities, and ultimately seizes them" rather than starting with an insurrectionary urban working class. The article contrasts this with classical Marxism, which "expected revolution to occur first in more industrialized countries among the urban proletariat."

Earlier grassroots attempts to move to household-based production were resisted by the communist regime under Mao. The paper also describes how Chinese reformers later built on rural pressure that had long been present in the countryside.

The article describes protracted people's war as a "revolutionary strategy developed by Mao Zedong" in which "revolutionary bases are first established in rural areas" and the revolution "gradually encircles and captures the cities." It notes that this strategy was based on "Mao's assessment of the predominantly agrarian nature of Chinese society" and his belief that "the peasantry could be mobilized as the main force of the revolution". The entry contrasts this with orthodox Marxist expectations of an urban proletarian uprising in industrial centers.

The page characterizes Mao Zedong Thought as "the application of Marxism–Leninism to Chinese conditions" and notes that one of its key components is "the theory of New Democracy and the strategy of encircling the cities from the countryside." It states that Mao "elevated the role of the peasantry" and argued that in a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country like China, the "peasantry rather than the urban proletariat" could serve as the principal force in the revolution. It highlights the idea of establishing "rural base areas" as a departure from the urban-centered model of earlier Marxist revolutions.

The article explains that Mao launched the "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside Movement" during the Cultural Revolution, under which "millions of educated urban youth" were sent "to rural villages and to frontier settlements" to "receive reeducation from the poor and lower-middle peasants." It notes that Mao's stated aim was to have urban students "learn from the workers and farmers" and that he "was from the countryside and wanted all educated youth to have experience there." This policy reflected Mao's ideological preference for the countryside and peasantry over urban elites and his broader effort to root socialism in rural society.

In standard historical accounts, Mao’s line is associated with the idea that revolution in China could begin in the countryside, surround the cities from rural base areas, and rely on peasant mobilization because China lacked a large, politically decisive industrial proletariat.

Modern historiography on Mao Zedong commonly holds that he adapted Marxism–Leninism to Chinese conditions by formulating a strategy of protracted people's war based on rural base areas and peasant mobilization. In this reading, Mao's line of "the countryside encircling the cities" is treated as a theoretical innovation that shifted the leading role in revolution from the urban industrial proletariat, emphasized in classical Marxism, to the peasantry in a predominantly agrarian society like China.