The Central Bank of the Russian Federation has set from 23.05.2026 the following exchange rates of foreign currencies against the ruble. The page lists the official rate for 1 US dollar at 71.2090 rubles and 1 euro at 82.5445 rubles. This is primary evidence of the ruble's official exchange-rate level around the time of the claim, but it does not say anything about gold sales or their purpose.

The Bank of Russia’s official statistics show the breakdown of international reserves into foreign exchange reserves and gold. For example, as of 30.04.2026 total international reserves were 758,678 million USD, of which gold was 337,521 million USD; on 31.12.2025 reserves were 754,853 million USD, of which gold was 326,537 million USD. The data series (available from 31.12.1992 to 30.04.2026) allows tracking changes in the value of gold within reserves over time, but the table does not specify any gold sales or foreign‑exchange interventions undertaken to support the ruble.

The Bank of Russia said it would reduce the amount of foreign currency sales under the fiscal rule from January 2026. The statement explains the central bank's currency-market operations and their scale, which is relevant to ruble support policy, but it does not mention selling gold reserves as the mechanism.

The staff report notes: "Following the imposition of wide‑ranging financial sanctions, the authorities relied mainly on exchange restrictions, a sharp policy rate hike, and targeted FX interventions funded from available foreign currency assets. There is no evidence that the Bank of Russia engaged in large‑scale sales of monetary gold to defend the ruble exchange rate." It adds: "International reserves, including gold, have remained broadly adequate in terms of standard metrics, notwithstanding the freezing of a substantial portion of foreign‑currency assets held abroad."

The BIS analysis of Russia’s reserve management under sanctions states: "With roughly half of its foreign exchange reserves immobilised by sanctions, Russia nevertheless refrained from selling its sizeable gold holdings on any meaningful scale." It continues: "Authorities instead used capital controls, interest rate policy and limited FX intervention from non‑sanctioned assets to stem ruble depreciation. Russia’s gold remained largely untouched as a buffer, in part because of the practical and legal difficulties of monetising it internationally under sanctions."

Interfax reports that the Russian Finance Ministry from 16 January to 5 February plans to sell foreign currency and gold under the budget rule for a total of 192.1 billion rubles, with a daily volume equivalent to 12.8 billion rubles. It adds that the Bank of Russia, adjusting the announced volumes, "will sell foreign currency in the amount of 17.42 billion rubles per day" during this period. The article frames these sales as part of the budget rule mechanism, not explicitly as an emergency measure to prevent a ruble collapse.

Kommersant writes that the Finance Ministry from 16 January to 5 February 2026 intends to sell foreign currency and gold for 192.1 billion rubles under the budget rule, with a daily volume of 12.8 billion rubles. It notes that, taking these operations into account, the Bank of Russia "will sell foreign currency in the amount of 17.42 billion rubles per day". The context given is compliance with the budget rule and adjustment of reserve operations; the article does not state that gold is being sold specifically to stop the ruble from collapsing, although it mentions that changes in FX supply can influence the ruble’s exchange rate.

BOFIT notes that “Russia’s federal budget deficit has forced the government and the Bank of Russia to tap into both the National Wealth Fund and official reserves. According to balance of payments data, the central bank has been a net seller of monetary gold in 2025.” It adds that “part of the motivation is to obtain hard currency and ruble liquidity needed to finance the deficit and smooth volatility in the FX market as the ruble comes under pressure from lower energy revenues and sanctions.”

An IMF analysis of Russia’s external sector states: “Following the intensification of sanctions, the authorities resorted to a wider use of gold in their reserve management, including the sale of part of their bullion holdings. These operations provided foreign exchange liquidity to the budget and to the domestic banking system.” The report notes that “gold sales were one of several instruments used to support ruble liquidity and address episodes of exchange‑rate pressure, alongside capital controls and interest‑rate policy.”

Banki.ru reports that "the need to cover the budget deficit and the shortage of foreign currency became the main reason for the Bank of Russia’s sale of gold from its international reserves at the beginning of 2026". Analyst Natalya Milchakova is quoted: "In our opinion, the regulator has two key reasons for such operations. First of all, it is covering the budget deficit... In addition, the sale of gold could be aimed at forming a stock of foreign currency — its deficit arose due to weak export revenues." She also notes that, in particular, "the Central Bank of Turkey sells gold from reserves to support a falling lira," drawing a comparison but not explicitly claiming that the Bank of Russia’s gold sales are primarily to prevent a ruble collapse.

Kitco reports that “Russia’s central bank has been forced to sell some of its gold reserves this year as the government struggles with a widening budget deficit and a weakening ruble.” The article cites analysts saying that “the sale of around 22 tonnes of gold so far in 2025 has helped provide hard currency and shore up confidence in the ruble,” and that “these sales are part of broader efforts to prevent a more severe depreciation of the Russian currency amid falling energy revenues and ongoing war‑related spending.”

Discussing the impact of sanctions on the Central Bank of Russia (CBR), the piece notes that by freezing the bank’s assets Western allies aimed to deprive Moscow of access to its $630 billion stockpile in reserves. It points out that "with a conservative estimate of 53 percent of its assets frozen and the central bank unable to buy swaps from Western banks, the CBR could suddenly look much less credible as a lender of last resort" and that its main response "has been to slam up interest rates, rather than to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market." It does not describe the CBR selling gold to prevent the ruble from collapsing.

The analysis explains that after the invasion of Ukraine, "Russia’s authorities moved swiftly to impose extensive capital controls and dramatically raise interest rates to support the ruble." It stresses: "Rather than drawing down gold reserves on a large scale, the central bank focused on administrative measures and mandatory FX sales by exporters." The author adds that sanctions and reputational risks "make it difficult for Russia to sell its gold in Western markets, limiting the usefulness of gold as a tool for day‑to‑day ruble support."

A 2025 survey‑based article on reserve management trends states: "Russia remains among the central banks that view gold as a strategic, long‑term asset and has not reported any significant net sales of bullion since the invasion of Ukraine." It explains that constraints on selling into Western markets and the desire to preserve a sanctions‑resistant asset "have discouraged Russian authorities from using gold actively for day‑to‑day FX intervention," even as the ruble has come under periodic pressure.

The piece summarizes a Finance Ministry statement that from 16 January to 5 February the ministry plans to sell foreign currency and gold under the budget rule for 192.1 billion rubles, with daily operations of 12.8 billion rubles. It quotes that the Bank of Russia in the first half of 2026 carries out buying or selling of foreign currency based on adjustments to the Finance Ministry’s volumes. These operations are presented as routine under the budget rule, without attributing them specifically to efforts to stop the ruble from collapsing.

Elite Trader notes that from 5 December 2025 to 15 January 2026 the Finance Ministry plans to sell foreign currency and gold for a total of 123.4 billion rubles within the budget rule, with a daily volume of 5.6 billion rubles. The article stresses that these sales are aimed at supporting budget stability and implemented via the budget rule mechanism, and it does not describe them as a direct policy to prevent a collapse of the ruble.

BullionStar’s review of the Bank of Russia’s gold policies notes that the Russian Federation holds one of the world’s largest monetary gold reserves and that these reserves are "owned and managed by the Bank of Russia" and stored domestically. It cites the central bank’s annual report: "The gold assets of the Bank of Russia are managed separately from its foreign currency reserve assets." The article focuses on Russia’s strategy of accumulating gold and does not document an official policy of selling gold to prevent ruble depreciation.

BullionVault wrote that the Central Bank of Russia sold bullion for the fourth month running in April and that the sales were being made while the Putin government faced a worsening budget deficit. It also quoted an analyst saying the metal was exchanged for yuan, but it did not provide an official confirmation that the purpose was to prevent the ruble from collapsing.

Kitco reported that the Bank of Russia had sold 21.8 tonnes of gold since the start of 2026 to help finance the country's budget deficit and that analysts linked the sales to support for the currency and other state expenses. This is supportive background, but it remains secondary reporting rather than an official statement of intent.

In Russian financial commentary during 2025–2026, some analysts and commentators have argued that sales of gold and foreign currency under the budget rule, and the Bank of Russia’s mirroring operations, indirectly help stabilise the ruble by increasing FX supply when export revenues fall. This line of argument often frames gold sales as part of a broader toolkit to avoid sharp ruble depreciation, even if official communications describe the primary purpose as budget smoothing and reserve management.

A Binance Square post claims that “Russia has liquidated over 70% of the gold holdings from its National Wealth Fund while continuing to finance ongoing military operations linked to the Ukraine conflict.” It argues that this “heavy drawdown signals increasing fiscal pressure as defense spending remains elevated and sanctions continue to weigh on the broader economy,” and warns that “if reserve depletion continues at this pace, it could reduce long‑term financial flexibility and limit Moscow’s ability to stabilize its currency and budget.”

In this video, the presenter says that “Russia has sold nearly 22,000 kilograms of gold this year” and that “the Bank of Russia has reduced its official gold reserves to around 74.1 million troy ounces as Moscow struggles with a growing budget deficit linked to the ongoing war in Ukraine.” The narration asserts that “Russia is constantly engaged in this war… which means in order to finance itself, it needs money from somewhere. That is why it started selling gold,” adding that the sales help “stabilize the government borrowing” and “support of ruble is also very much needed, otherwise it will lose its credibility… they are moving towards [gold] as a last resort asset.”