The Bank of Russia informs that, starting from November 2025, mirroring operations related to the use of liquid assets of the National Wealth Fund will be carried out not only in Chinese yuan but also in gold on the domestic market. These operations are conducted in rubles on the Moscow Exchange and are aimed at neutralizing the impact of budget operations on the ruble exchange rate and inflation. The Bank of Russia does not conduct direct exchange of gold for foreign currency within these operations; all settlements are carried out in rubles.

In public communications since 2022–2025, the Bank of Russia has repeatedly stated that it maintains a significant share of its international reserves in gold and Chinese yuan. These materials describe the currency and asset composition of reserves, but do not state that the Bank of Russia is selling gold in exchange for Chinese yuan; instead, they emphasise holding both assets as part of reserve diversification and risk management.

The international reserves of the Russian Federation are highly liquid foreign assets held by the Bank of Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation. They consist of monetary gold, special drawing rights (SDRs), reserve position in the IMF, and foreign exchange assets (foreign currency in cash and deposits, securities). The structure of reserves by asset class and currency composition is published with a time lag, in line with international statistical standards.

The Bank of Russia’s official statistics show the total volume and composition of Russia’s international reserves, including monetary gold and foreign currency assets. The data series records changes in the level of gold holdings and foreign exchange, but it does not identify specific transactions of selling gold for yuan, nor does it list gold-for-yuan swaps; changes in components are reported as aggregate balances in U.S. dollar terms.

The Bank of Russia told Interfax that it mirrors operations with the National Wealth Fund’s liquid FX assets (yuan and gold) by making equivalent transactions on the domestic market. The regulator said: "As the liquidity of the domestic gold market has increased in recent years, in connection with the implementation of the budget rule and other NWF operations, the Bank of Russia carries out these equivalent operations on the domestic market not only by buying and selling yuan for rubles, but also partly by buying and selling gold." The article notes that these are operations in rubles; it does not indicate that the Bank of Russia sells gold in exchange for Chinese yuan.

Following the freezing of a large share of Russia’s foreign reserves, the authorities have increasingly relied on gold and Chinese yuan as key reserve assets. To finance fiscal deficits, operations under the fiscal rule involved the sale of yuan-denominated assets on the domestic market and, more recently, sales of gold for roubles, proceeds of which are transferred to the National Wealth Fund. The report notes these operations but does not state that gold is being sold in direct exchange for yuan rather than for domestic currency.

In its discussion of Russia’s international reserves, the IMF notes that the Central Bank of Russia has shifted a significant portion of its assets into gold and Chinese yuan after 2014 and especially after 2022. The report describes the composition and valuation of reserves and sanctions-related constraints, but it does not indicate that the Bank of Russia is engaging in systematic gold-for-yuan swap operations or selling gold directly in exchange for Chinese yuan as a primary policy tool.

The Bank of Russia has begun selling gold from its reserves locally. The bank announced on November 19 that it would sell gold on local markets and channel the proceeds to the country’s National Wealth Fund (NWF). The sales are being conducted as part of operations under Russia’s fiscal rule, which traditionally involved buying and selling Chinese renminbi (yuan), but the announcement did not say the gold was being directly exchanged for yuan; rather, it said the proceeds would be used for NWF operations.

The note describes a two-step mechanism in which the Russian Ministry of Finance sells gold and yuan from the National Wealth Fund to the central bank for roubles. The central bank then conducts so-called mirroring operations on the domestic market in rouble-yuan instruments (and, more recently, partially in gold) to neutralize the liquidity impact. Although the process can result in an effective shift from gold holdings toward yuan-denominated assets, official data and statements indicate that the central bank does not directly exchange gold for yuan in a single transaction.

A BIS paper reviewing reserve management in emerging markets notes that Russia has substantially increased the share of gold and Chinese yuan in its international reserves since mid‑2010s. It explains that this shift reflects diversification and sanctions risk mitigation. The paper discusses asset allocation and currency composition, but it does not document that the Bank of Russia is selling gold in exchange for Chinese yuan as a routine practice.

The Russian central bank has sold 700,000 troy ounces of gold so far this year, data showed on Monday. The Russian central bank started to sell gold on the market in November 2025 as part of its operations on behalf of the fiscal reserve National Wealth Fund. It said at the time that it needed to diversify its reserves since the price rise had increased the proportion of gold in its reserves, and that it had taken advantage of increased liquidity on the domestic market. The report described gold sales and separate trading in Chinese yuan but did not say the gold was being swapped directly into yuan.

Russia’s Central Bank has for the first time begun selling physical gold from its reserves as part of Finance Ministry operations to fund the state budget, the Bank said on Wednesday. … “With domestic gold market liquidity having increased in recent years, the Bank of Russia now conducts equivalent operations on the domestic market not only through yuan transactions but also partially through gold,” a Central Bank spokesperson told Interfax. Economists said these gold sales help the Central Bank inject currency into the market to support the ruble while easing pressure on yuan holdings.

According to the Bank of Russia’s review of its management of foreign currency and gold assets, "the positions of the yuan in the Bank of Russia’s gold and foreign currency assets strengthened over the year from 12.3% to 12.8%." It adds that gold in the Bank of Russia’s vaults accounted for 23.3% of assets as of 31 December 2020, and notes that the Bank purchased gold from Russian credit institutions. The review describes purchases of gold and the growing shares of both gold and yuan in reserves, but does not describe any operations where gold is sold in exchange for Chinese yuan.

In November, the Central Bank started selling gold from its reserves on the domestic market. The regulator said it would transfer the proceeds to the National Wealth Fund, whose liquid assets are now held only in yuan and gold after the freezing of Western currencies. The article notes that under the budget rule, the Ministry of Finance buys and sells Chinese yuan using rubles, while the new scheme adds gold sales, but it does not describe a mechanism where gold is directly exchanged for yuan.

Under Western sanctions, Russia has relied on gold and the Chinese yuan as its main reserve assets. The central bank sells gold and other assets to the finance ministry for roubles, which are then used for budget spending. A portion of these roubles is later exchanged for yuan on the Moscow Exchange to pay for imports from China. This mechanism, while not a formal gold-for-yuan swap, effectively converts Russian bullion into yuan liquidity over time.

A multi-year drive to reduce exposure to U.S. assets has pushed the share of gold in Russia’s $583 billion international reserves above dollars for the first time on record. Gold made up 23% of the central bank’s stockpile as of the end of June 2020… About 12% of the stash is in yuan. … The central bank said it stopped buying gold in the first half of last year to encourage miners and banks to export more and bring in foreign currency into Russia after oil prices crashed.

Citing a report by The Moscow Times, the article says: "In November 2025, China purchased gold from Russia for a record $961 million – the largest deal in the history of Russian-Chinese relations." It further notes that at the end of November the Ukrainian news agency UNN reported that for the first time in history the Central Bank of Russia is selling sovereign gold from its reserves directly on the domestic market, and that gold is becoming a tool to support the ruble and cover budget needs. The piece discusses gold exports to China and domestic sales of gold, but it does not state that the Central Bank is selling gold specifically in exchange for Chinese yuan.

Discussing Russia’s post-2022 reserve strategy, the report notes that “gold has increasingly functioned as a bridge asset, allowing Moscow to transform domestic bullion into usable foreign currency, most often Chinese yuan, through a sequence of operations involving sales for roubles and subsequent currency conversion.” It stresses, however, that the Bank of Russia’s official mirroring operations are technically executed in roubles and that “no formal gold-for-yuan swap line has been publicly acknowledged by either the Bank of Russia or the People’s Bank of China.”

The article reports that on 19 May the Bank of Russia conducted operations to purchase yuan on the domestic market, with a total volume of 1.2 billion rubles. It notes that these operations are aimed at supporting financial stability and implementing the budget rule and that they involve purchasing yuan and gold. The focus is on purchases, not sales, and the article does not say that the Bank of Russia sells gold in exchange for Chinese yuan.

Current estimates suggest Russia may liquidate approximately 230 tonnes of gold valued at $30 billion throughout 2025, representing a sizeable share of its bullion reserves. Much of this metal is expected to be sold into the domestic market via the Moscow Exchange, with proceeds raised in roubles and then used by the finance ministry to cover the budget deficit. Analysts widely assume that a significant share of the rouble proceeds will ultimately be converted into Chinese yuan to pay for imports and service external obligations, effectively turning Russia’s gold sales into an indirect swap of gold into yuan.

After major Western sanctions in 2022, public data and central bank disclosures indicated that Russia sharply increased the share of Chinese yuan and gold in its international reserves, while reducing exposure to US dollars and euros. However, there has been no widely reported evidence that the Bank of Russia routinely conducts direct gold-for-yuan swaps with the People’s Bank of China; rather, reporting focuses on domestic gold monetisation and separate management of yuan assets.

In this broadcast, economist Alexander Savchenko states that "Russia is selling gold reserves to China to cover budget holes" and that the Kremlin has sharply increased gold exports to China, effectively moving to a forced sale of reserves under financial pressure. He refers to information from the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine claiming Russia supplied more than 25 tonnes of gold to China last year. The video claims that Russia is selling its gold reserves to China, but it does not provide detailed evidence that the Bank of Russia is transacting gold specifically in exchange for Chinese yuan rather than simply exporting gold for foreign currency revenue.

Russia's Central Bank has begun selling physical gold from its reserves for the first time as part of a move to fund the state budget and stabilize the ruble. The sales, which began in November 2025, are being conducted on the domestic market in a similar fashion to how Chinese yuan is traded. The post also notes that Russia has "previously held more gold than US dollars in its international reserves" and that gold and yuan are now its main liquid assets, implicitly suggesting an operational linkage between selling gold and managing yuan positions, but it does not provide official documentation of a direct gold‑for‑yuan swap.

In a discussion of recent central bank activity, the host says: "And then Russia. Russia has been liquidating since 2025 to fund its ongoing war, raising about $2.4 billion with holdings now at a 4-year low." The video describes Russia’s sales of gold and its reliance on yuan as key reserve assets but frames these as part of broader reserve management during a currency crisis; it does not present clear evidence that the Bank of Russia is explicitly selling gold in exchange for Chinese yuan rather than primarily for roubles.