2213 published verifications avg. score 5.4/10 987 rated true or mostly true 901 rated false or mostly false
“Sugar deficiency increases testosterone levels in men.”
The evidence does not show that sugar deficiency raises testosterone in men generally. Better-quality research finds low-carbohydrate diets do not consistently increase resting testosterone, and some versions may lower it. Limited benefits seen in certain hypogonadal men with metabolic syndrome cannot be generalized to all men or attributed specifically to "sugar deficiency."
“Katy Perry has been accused of assaulting women.”
The evidence supports that Ruby Rose publicly accused Katy Perry of sexual assault and that police examined a historical allegation. But the claim overstates the record by saying "women," which suggests multiple female accusers when the cited evidence points to one woman. The allegation was also denied and remained unproven in the sources provided.
“A child's adult height is primarily inherited from the father rather than the mother.”
Height is not mainly inherited from the father. The best available evidence shows adult height is a highly polygenic trait shaped by many genes inherited from both parents, plus environmental factors such as nutrition and health. Studies cited for a paternal effect are either preliminary, locus-specific, or misinterpreted, and some actually show strong maternal associations rather than paternal dominance.
“In most OECD member-country electricity markets, the levelized cost of energy for new utility-scale solar photovoltaic power and new onshore wind power is lower than the levelized cost of energy for new natural-gas combined-cycle power plants.”
Available high-quality evidence supports the claim’s broad direction: new onshore wind, and often utility-scale solar, usually have lower project-level LCOE than new gas combined-cycle plants across much of the OECD. OECD cross-country data, plus recent U.S. and European studies, point the same way. The main limitation is incomplete OECD-wide coverage, and solar’s advantage depends more on local sunlight and gas-price conditions.
“Solar and wind power are the cheapest sources of new electricity generation in most major markets.”
Current evidence broadly supports the statement for utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind. Major recent analyses from the IEA, EIA, BloombergNEF, Wood Mackenzie, and Lazard generally find them to be the cheapest new-build options in many large markets. The key limitation is that this is mostly an LCOE comparison; full system costs and some regional gas markets can change the ranking.
“United States automakers were sheltered by tariffs but were not made more competitive relative to Japanese automakers.”
The core point holds: trade protection shielded U.S. automakers from Japanese competition without closing the competitiveness gap. The best evidence shows short-term gains in prices, output, and profits, but not lasting relative improvements in productivity or market position. The main caveat is that the key 1980s policy was a voluntary export restraint/quota rather than a standard tariff.
“Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019) found that the 2018 United States tariffs raised United States import prices nearly one-for-one.”
The claim accurately reflects the paper’s main result: the 2018 tariffs were passed through almost fully into the prices paid by U.S. importers. The key caveat is that this refers to tariff-inclusive import prices, not foreign exporters raising their pre-tariff prices one-for-one. That missing definition makes the wording somewhat imprecise, but not materially wrong.
“In a 2017 publication, Kyle Handley and Nuno Limão argue that policy uncertainty suppresses trade and investment planning.”
The 2017 AER publication supports the claim’s substance. Handley and Limão argue that trade policy uncertainty reduces firms’ investment decisions such as export entry and technology upgrading, which in turn reduces trade flows. The wording “investment planning” is somewhat broader than the paper’s technical language, but it does not materially misstate the argument.
“In a 2019 study, Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce found that U.S. industries facing higher input costs from tariffs, including steel-consuming manufacturers, experienced net employment losses rather than gains.”
The claim accurately reflects the study’s main finding: industries more exposed to tariff-related input-cost increases saw employment decline on net, rather than rise. Flaaen and Pierce found that the negative input-cost and retaliation effects outweighed the smaller employment gains from import protection. The wording is slightly compressed because the 2019 paper was a Federal Reserve working paper at the time, and “steel-consuming manufacturers” is an example rather than the paper’s formal category.
“The academic studies Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) and Amiti et al. (2019) concluded that the costs of tariffs are borne primarily by domestic consumers and importers.”
The named studies did characterize tariff costs as falling mainly on U.S. importers and consumers. Both Amiti et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) reported near-complete pass-through of the 2018 tariffs into U.S. prices, meaning foreign exporters did not absorb most of the burden. Additional findings about producer gains or retaliation do not negate that core conclusion.
“United States households that purchased Japanese-brand vehicles faced higher prices starting in 2018 because of United States tariffs affecting United States–Japan automotive trade.”
The evidence does not support the claim’s stated cause. No new Japan-targeted U.S. automotive tariffs took effect in 2018, and the later U.S.-Japan deal did not newly raise tariffs on Japanese cars. Broad steel and aluminum tariffs may have affected some costs indirectly, but that is not the same as higher prices caused by tariffs on U.S.-Japan automotive trade.
“The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami caused fatalities in 14 countries around the Indian Ocean.”
The commonly cited figure is 14 countries, and the strongest UN-linked sources support that count for deaths or dead-and-missing cases from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, some sources use different counting methods and mention additional affected countries, which creates minor uncertainty around the exact total. The core claim is substantially accurate, but the number depends somewhat on definition.
“In 2025, Japanese firms reported that uncertainty about United States tariffs was adversely affecting their investment decisions in the United States.”
Japanese business surveys and business leaders did report in 2025 that U.S. tariff uncertainty was hurting investment sentiment and complicating decisions about U.S. operations. The strongest support comes from JETRO, JBIC, and Keidanren. But the claim reads somewhat too strongly as a statement about concrete investment pullbacks, since many firms still planned U.S. expansion and some uncertainty eased after the mid-2025 trade deal.
“Between 2018 and 2025, the United States imposed Section 232 tariffs of 25% on steel imports from Japan.”
The core assertion is supported: the United States imposed a 25% Section 232 tariff on steel from Japan starting in 2018. The main caveat is that, from April 2022, Japan received a tariff-rate quota allowing specified volumes to enter duty-free, with the 25% duty generally applying to over-quota imports. So the claim is accurate in broad terms, but it overstates continuity if read as applying to all Japanese steel throughout the entire period.
“The United States imposed Section 232 tariffs of 25% on steel imports and 10% on aluminium imports on national security grounds.”
The statement accurately describes the original 2018 Section 232 action. Official U.S. sources show the tariffs were imposed on national security grounds at 25% for steel and 10% for aluminum. Later changes raised and modified those rates, but they do not undo the historical fact stated here.
“Public opinion in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s was deeply divided over the Vietnam War.”
Reliable polling shows Americans were strongly split over the Vietnam War, particularly in the late 1960s when public opinion was often close to even. That said, by the early 1970s a clear majority viewed the war negatively, so the division was no longer as evenly balanced. The claim captures the overall conflict in public opinion but compresses an important shift over time.
“The average business-to-business sales cycle length is 211 days.”
The 211-day figure is not supported as the average B2B sales cycle overall. It appears to come from an enterprise-software-specific anecdotal source, while stronger benchmark data places typical B2B sales cycles much lower, often around 84 to 155 days depending on sector. Treating 211 days as a universal average overstates what the evidence shows.
“The Walk Free Global Slavery Index 2023 lists India, China, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Indonesia as the six countries with the largest estimated numbers of people in modern slavery.”
Walk Free’s 2023 index does place India, China, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and Indonesia as the top six countries by estimated number of people in modern slavery. The wording is somewhat incomplete because the report actually continues to a top ten, not a standalone official top six. That caveat does not change the main factual takeaway.
“Hantaviruses can be transmitted to humans through inhalation of aerosolized particles from infected rodent urine, droppings, or saliva.”
Public-health authorities clearly support this transmission route. WHO, CDC, and other medical sources state that people can become infected by breathing in aerosolized particles contaminated by infected rodent urine, droppings, or saliva. The main caveat is that this is the primary, not the only, route and usually involves disturbed contaminated material.
“In 2021, about 29.3 million people were living in modern slavery in Asia and the Pacific.”
The evidence supports this figure as the Global Slavery Index 2023 estimate for Asia and the Pacific in 2021. The main confusion comes from comparing “modern slavery” with “forced labour” alone or from weaker secondary sources that misstate the number. This is a modelled point-in-time estimate, not a direct census count.