2,554 verifications avg. score 5.6/10 1,249 rated (mostly) true 1,067 rated (mostly) false
“In Nagô (Yoruba) sculpture, the head is often depicted disproportionately large relative to the body because the head (Orí Inú) is considered the center of destiny and spiritual connection.”
The claim is well supported by art-historical and Yoruba-studies sources. They commonly describe Yoruba sculpture as emphasizing the head, often by enlarging it, because Orí is understood as the seat of destiny and spiritual force. The main caveat is scope: this is a frequent convention, not a universal rule, and “Nagô” is a diaspora term related to Yoruba traditions.
“In humans, the GIP gene functions as an oncogene in ovarian tumors.”
The claim is not supported because it confuses two different genes. The ovarian cancer “gip2” literature refers to GNAI2, not the human GIP gene that encodes an incretin hormone. Studies about incretin drugs or indirect pathway effects also do not show that GIP itself functions as an oncogene in ovarian tumors.
“Shawn Mendes became popular after posting singing videos online when he was a teenager.”
The evidence strongly supports the claim. Reputable biographies and news profiles consistently say Shawn Mendes gained popularity as a teenager by posting singing covers online, most notably on Vine and also on YouTube. The main nuance is that Vine was the decisive breakout platform, but that does not change the core fact described.
“Pourewa Creek Reserve is located within the Tāmaki Ecological District.”
Available evidence supports the claim. Local restoration and reserve planning documents place the Pourewa area in Ōrākei and explicitly describe the project area as within the Tāmaki Ecological District, matching wider descriptions of that district’s Auckland isthmus coverage. The main limitation is that the cited record does not show a direct DOC GIS overlay of the reserve’s exact legal boundary.
“Reducing dietary intake of added sugar increases testosterone levels in men.”
Evidence suggests sugar can be linked to lower testosterone, but it does not show that simply reducing added sugar reliably raises testosterone in men. The strongest studies show short-term testosterone dips after glucose and observational links with sugary drinks, while long-term diet studies usually mix sugar reduction with weight loss and other metabolic changes. The causal claim is stronger than the evidence supports.
“Sugar deficiency increases testosterone levels in men.”
The evidence does not support the idea that “sugar deficiency” raises testosterone in men. Studies more narrowly suggest that excess sugar or glucose loads can lower testosterone, and that cutting excessive sugar may improve levels in some metabolically unhealthy men. That is not the same as showing that a deficiency of sugar increases testosterone, especially across men in general.
“Katy Perry has been accused of assaulting women.”
The evidence supports that Katy Perry was accused by one woman, Ruby Rose, not that multiple women have accused her. Major outlets reported Rose's allegation and Perry's denial, and some reported a police inquiry, but credible sourcing for additional female accusers is absent. The plural wording materially exaggerates what is verified.
“A child's adult height is primarily inherited from the father rather than the mother.”
Height is not mainly inherited from the father. The best available evidence shows adult height is a highly polygenic trait shaped by many genes inherited from both parents, plus environmental factors such as nutrition and health. Studies cited for a paternal effect are either preliminary, locus-specific, or misinterpreted, and some actually show strong maternal associations rather than paternal dominance.
“In most OECD member-country electricity markets, the levelized cost of energy for new utility-scale solar photovoltaic power and new onshore wind power is lower than the levelized cost of energy for new natural-gas combined-cycle power plants.”
Available high-quality evidence supports the claim’s broad direction: new onshore wind, and often utility-scale solar, usually have lower project-level LCOE than new gas combined-cycle plants across much of the OECD. OECD cross-country data, plus recent U.S. and European studies, point the same way. The main limitation is incomplete OECD-wide coverage, and solar’s advantage depends more on local sunlight and gas-price conditions.
“Solar and wind power are the cheapest sources of new electricity generation in most major markets.”
Current evidence broadly supports the statement for utility-scale solar PV and onshore wind. Major recent analyses from the IEA, EIA, BloombergNEF, Wood Mackenzie, and Lazard generally find them to be the cheapest new-build options in many large markets. The key limitation is that this is mostly an LCOE comparison; full system costs and some regional gas markets can change the ranking.
“United States automakers were sheltered by tariffs but were not made more competitive relative to Japanese automakers.”
The core point holds: trade protection shielded U.S. automakers from Japanese competition without closing the competitiveness gap. The best evidence shows short-term gains in prices, output, and profits, but not lasting relative improvements in productivity or market position. The main caveat is that the key 1980s policy was a voluntary export restraint/quota rather than a standard tariff.
“Amiti, Redding, and Weinstein (2019) found that the 2018 United States tariffs raised United States import prices nearly one-for-one.”
The claim accurately reflects the paper’s main result: the 2018 tariffs were passed through almost fully into the prices paid by U.S. importers. The key caveat is that this refers to tariff-inclusive import prices, not foreign exporters raising their pre-tariff prices one-for-one. That missing definition makes the wording somewhat imprecise, but not materially wrong.
“In a 2017 publication, Kyle Handley and Nuno Limão argue that policy uncertainty suppresses trade and investment planning.”
The 2017 AER publication supports the claim’s substance. Handley and Limão argue that trade policy uncertainty reduces firms’ investment decisions such as export entry and technology upgrading, which in turn reduces trade flows. The wording “investment planning” is somewhat broader than the paper’s technical language, but it does not materially misstate the argument.
“In a 2019 study, Aaron Flaaen and Justin Pierce found that U.S. industries facing higher input costs from tariffs, including steel-consuming manufacturers, experienced net employment losses rather than gains.”
The claim accurately reflects the study’s main finding: industries more exposed to tariff-related input-cost increases saw employment decline on net, rather than rise. Flaaen and Pierce found that the negative input-cost and retaliation effects outweighed the smaller employment gains from import protection. The wording is slightly compressed because the 2019 paper was a Federal Reserve working paper at the time, and “steel-consuming manufacturers” is an example rather than the paper’s formal category.
“The academic studies Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) and Amiti et al. (2019) concluded that the costs of tariffs are borne primarily by domestic consumers and importers.”
The named studies did characterize tariff costs as falling mainly on U.S. importers and consumers. Both Amiti et al. (2019) and Fajgelbaum et al. (2020) reported near-complete pass-through of the 2018 tariffs into U.S. prices, meaning foreign exporters did not absorb most of the burden. Additional findings about producer gains or retaliation do not negate that core conclusion.
“United States households that purchased Japanese-brand vehicles faced higher prices starting in 2018 because of United States tariffs affecting United States–Japan automotive trade.”
The evidence does not support the claim’s central timeline or cause. In 2018, the United States investigated or threatened auto tariffs, but Japan-specific automotive tariffs were not imposed then; the relevant measures arrived later, in 2025. Broader 2018 steel and aluminum tariffs are a different policy and do not substantiate the claim that U.S.–Japan automotive trade tariffs raised Japanese-brand vehicle prices starting in 2018.
“The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami caused fatalities in 14 countries around the Indian Ocean.”
The commonly cited figure is 14 countries, and the strongest UN-linked sources support that count for deaths or dead-and-missing cases from the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. However, some sources use different counting methods and mention additional affected countries, which creates minor uncertainty around the exact total. The core claim is substantially accurate, but the number depends somewhat on definition.
“In 2025, Japanese firms reported that uncertainty about United States tariffs was adversely affecting their investment decisions in the United States.”
Japanese business surveys and business leaders did report in 2025 that U.S. tariff uncertainty was hurting investment sentiment and complicating decisions about U.S. operations. The strongest support comes from JETRO, JBIC, and Keidanren. But the claim reads somewhat too strongly as a statement about concrete investment pullbacks, since many firms still planned U.S. expansion and some uncertainty eased after the mid-2025 trade deal.
“Between 2018 and 2025, the United States imposed Section 232 tariffs of 25% on steel imports from Japan.”
The core assertion is supported: the United States imposed a 25% Section 232 tariff on steel from Japan starting in 2018. The main caveat is that, from April 2022, Japan received a tariff-rate quota allowing specified volumes to enter duty-free, with the 25% duty generally applying to over-quota imports. So the claim is accurate in broad terms, but it overstates continuity if read as applying to all Japanese steel throughout the entire period.
“The United States imposed Section 232 tariffs of 25% on steel imports and 10% on aluminium imports on national security grounds.”
The statement accurately describes the original 2018 Section 232 action. Official U.S. sources show the tariffs were imposed on national security grounds at 25% for steel and 10% for aluminum. Later changes raised and modified those rates, but they do not undo the historical fact stated here.